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Abstract
This paper develops a Trade Network Game (TNG) that combines evolution
ary game play with endogenous partner selection. Resource-constrained buyers
and sellers choose and refuse trade partners on the basis of continually updated
expected payoffs. Partner selection takes place in accordance with a "deferred
choice and refusal" mechanism that is shown to have interesting stability, op-
timality, and uniqueness properties. The iterated prisoner's dilemma strategies
used by buyers and sellers to conduct their trades are evolved over time via a
genetic algorithm that biases reproduction in favor of strategies that have been
successful in past trades. The TNG is shown to encompass a variety of economic
applications, such as job search games, labor markets modelled as assignment
games, labor markets with endogenously determined workers and employers, and
double auction games. To illustrate the way in which preferential partner selec
tion interacts with game play in the TNG, resulting in the endogenous formation
of trade networks, a 5-trader TNG is analyzed in detail.
Keywords: Trade networks; evolutionary game; optimal search; endogenous
interactions; iterated prisoner's dilemma; multi-armed bandit game; assignment
game; preferential partner matching; genetic algorithm; artificial life; criterion
filtering.
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ety for Computational Economics.-and the SFI Economic Alife Workshop. The author thanks W. B. Arthur,
D. Ashlock, A. DeVany, C. Ellis, G. Evans, J. Gray, V. Honavar, D. McFadzean, R. Noll, P. Orazem,
M. Smucker, and A. Stanley for helpful comments.
1 Introduction
In the evolutionary game literature, game partners are typically matched either randomly
or by means ofa deterministic mechanism such as round robin. As detailed in Kirman [12].
the focus is then on the determination of optimal strategies for the players, conditional
on these matchings. In contrast, as seen in Roth and Sotomayor [16], the optimal search
literature focuses on agent matching mechanisms exhibiting various stability and optimality
properties, but these mechanisms are usually studied in static contexts.
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This paper develops a "Trade Network Game" "(TNG) that combines evolutionary game
play with optimal partner selection.^ The set of players is the union of two possibly over
lapping subsets of traders, called "buyers" and "sellers." Buyers submit trade offers only
to their most preferred sellers, and sellers only accept trade offers from their most preferred
buyers, where preference rankings are determined on the basis of continually updated ex
pected payoffs. Each trade offer is an invitation to participate'in a prisoner's dilemma game,
with cooperation denoting that a trader carries out his trade obligations and a defection in
dicating that he does not. The iterated prisoner's dilemma strategies used by the traders to
conduct their trades are evolved over time via a genetic algorithm that biases reproduction
in favor of fitness (success in past trades).
In particular, traders in tlie TNG are'assumed to use a" "iieferred choice and refusal"
(DOR) mechanism to determine'their trade partners in each iteration. This mechanism com
bines certain features of the preferential partner selection mechanism developed by Stanley
et al. [19] for "an iterated prisoner's dilemma game incorporating partner choice and refusal
(IPD/CR) and the deferred acceptancematchingmechanism developed by Gale and Shapley
8] for an assignment problem.
Also, each buyer and seller in the TNG is constrained by a quota on the number of
trade offers he'can submit or accept, respectively. The degree of complexity of the trade
interaction patterns can thus be systematically controlled by varying the buyer and seller
subsets and the quota levels. At one extreme the buyer and seller subsets can coincide, as in
the IPD/CR, and the quota levels can be taken to be arbitrarily large.' In this case all agents
^For other recent economic work that focuses on the endogenous determination of agent interactions, see
De Vany [6], Durlauf [7],'Mailath et al. [13], and Vriend [22].
can submit, accept, and refuse trade offers to or from whomever they please, and the degree
to which traders resemble pure buyers (agents who only submit offers) rather than pure
sellers (agents who only receive offers) is determined endogenously. At the other extreme,
an evolutionary Gale-Shapley marriage game is obtained if the buyer and seller subsets are
taken to be disjoint sets of equal cardinahty and all quotas are set at one.
The IPD/CR simulation experiments reported in Stanley et al. [19], Ashlock et al. [2j.
and Smucker et al. [18], indicate that the overall emergence of cooperation is accelerated in
evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games by the introduction of a preferential partner selection
mechanism. The ability to direct game offers to preferred partners increases a player's
chances of interacting with cooperators, whether he himself has cooperative intentions or not:
and the ability to refuse game offers permits a player to protect himself against opportunistic
defectors without having to defect himself. Nevertheless, the player interaction patterns in
these experiments tend to be quite complex and kaleidoscopic, and it has proved difficult to
get an analytical handle on the mapping from game structure to resulting player interaction
patterns.
The primary objective of the current paper is to develop the basic TNG framework, and
to demonstrate that the TNG encompasses a number of potentially interesting economic
applications that extend previous studies: in particular, job-search games; labor markets
with endogenously determined layoffs and quits; market models with endogenously deter
mined interactions among input suppliers, producers, and households; labor markets with
endogenously determined workers and employers; and double auction games. Another ob
jective is to establish the existence of at least one trade partner selection mechanism for the
TNG—namely, the DCR mechanism—that exhibits interesting stabihty, social optimality,
and uniqueness properties. To illustrate the way in which DCR partner selection interacts
with game play in the TNG, resulting in the endogenous formation of trade networks, a
5-trader TNG is analyzed in detail. In particular, it is shown that the parameter space for
this TNG can be partitioned into economically interpretable regions resulting in qualitatively
distinct types of trade network formation.
A C-fH- implementation of the TNG is currently under development (McFadzean and
Tesfatsion [14]). This TNG program will be used to study the formation and evolution of
trade networks in the context of variously structured trading environments. One goal will be
to see whether the long-run trade networks'that evolve under the DCRrhechanism exhibit a
more'systematic and interpretable relation to structural parameters than has been found to
date for the player interaction patterns in the IPD/CR. Another goal will be to see whether
trade partner selection mechanisms exhibiting stalbility and optimality properties emerge
naturally in the TNG once this mechanism is allowed to evolve conjointly with the traders
strategies. Also ofinterest will be the trade networks that form and evolve under alternative
specifications for the buyer and seller subsets and-quotas. These networks may shed some
light on an interesting question recently posed by Burdett et al. [4, p. 1] in the context of
a search-theoretic monetary'model: "Is there some way to determine endogenously which
agents will be willing to invest resources in the process of active search for trade partners
and which agents will prefer to passively wait for trade partners to come to them?" In the
TNG, a trader's wilHngness to search actively for trade partners (act as a buyer) is tempered
b}' endogenous events such as seller defections, refusals of trade offers, and volume of trade
offers received.
The basic TNG model is set out in Section 2, and economic applications of the TNG
are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 establishes Ivarious stability, social optimality, and
uniqueness properties for the DCR mechanism that the TNG traders use to determine their
trade partners. Section 5 discusses the properties of the criterion-filter that the TNG traders
use to update their expected payoffs. The finite state machine representation for the traders'
strategies and the genetic algorithm used to evolve these strategies are explained in Section 6.
An illustrative 5-trader TNG is analyzed in Section 7. Concluding remarks are given in
Section 8. - . p
2 The Basic Trade Network Game
The set of traders for the Trade Network Game (TNG) is the union V = B U 5 of a
nonempty subset B of buyers who can submit trade offers and a nonempty subset S of sellers
who can receive trade offers, where B and S' may be disjoint,'overlapping; or coincident. For
example, the buyers and sellers might represent customers and retail'store owners, workers
and employers, borrowers and lenders, or auction traders.
Each generation" of buyers and sellers participates in a trade cycle loop consisting of a
fixed number of trade cycles. In each trade cycle, each buyer m can submit up to 0^^ trade
offers to sellers, and each seller n can accept up to An trade offers from buyers, where 0„i
and An are strictly positive. One interpretation for the offer quota Om is that buyer m has
a limited amount of resources (credit, labor time, collateral,...) to trade in exchange for
other items, and one interpretation for the acceptance quota is that seller n has a hmiled
amount of items (goods, job openings, loans,...) to provide.
As detailed in Section 4, the buyers and sellers use a deferred choice and refusal (DCR)
mechanism to determine their submission, acceptance, and refusal of trade offers in each
trade cycle on the basis of their current expected payoffs. Roughly summarized, this mecha
nism proceeds as follows. Each buyer and seller has an exogenously given minimum tolerance
level, in the sense that he will not trade with anyone whose expected payoff lies below this
level. Each buyer m first makes trade offers to a maximum of Om tolerable most-preferred
sellers, with at most one offer going to any one seller. Each seller n in turn forms a waiting-
list consisting of a maximum of An of the most preferred trade offers he has received to date
from tolerable buyers; all other trade offers are refused. If a buyer has a trade offer refused,
he can submit a replacement trade offer to a tolerable next-most-preferred seller that has not
yet refused him. A seller receiving a new trade offer that dominates a trade offer currently
on his waiting-list can substitute this new trade offer in place of the dominated trade offer,
which is then refused. A buyer ceases making trade offers when either he has no further
trade offers refused or all tolerable sellers have already refused him.
A trade offer is an offer by a buyer to a seller to participate in a risky trade, modelled
as a prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. For example, the trade may involve the exchange of a
good or service of a certain promised quality in return for a loan or wage contract entailing
various payment obligations. A buyer participating in a trade may either "cooperate" (fulfill
his trade obligations) or "defect" (renege on his trade obligations), and similarly for a seller.
The trade behavior of each trader, whether he is a pure buyer in V —5, a buyer-seller in
Bn 5, or a pure seller in V —5, is characterized by a finite-memory pure strategy for playing
a PD-game against an arbitrary opppnent an indefinite number of times, hereafter referred
to as a trade strategy. Each trader thus has a distinct trading personality even if he engages
in both buying and selling activities. No trader knows any other trader's strategy a priori\
he can only learn about it by engaging the other trader in repeated trades and observing
the payoff history that ensues. Moreover, each trader's choice ofan action in a current trade
with a potential trade partner is determined entirely on the basis of the payoffs obtained in
past trades with this same partner. Consequently, different aspects of a trader's personality
may be expressed in trades with different trade partners. For example, at any given time a
trader might be in a generous cooperative mode with some of his trade partners and in an
opportunisticall}^ defecting mode with others.
The range of possible payoffs is'the same for each trade in each trade cycle: namely, L
is the lowest possible payoff, received by a cooperative trader whose trade partner defects;
D is the payoff received by a defecting trader whose trade partner also defects; C is the
payoff received by a cooperative trader whose trade partner also cooperates; and H is the
highest possible payoff, received by a defecting trader whose trade partner cooperates. More
precisely, the payoffs are assumed to satisfy
L < D < 0 < C < H , with {L-\-H)/2 < C, (1)
where the far-right inequality constraint is the standard PD constraint guaranteeing that
the average payoff obtained from mutual cooperation dominates the average payoff obtained
from the asynchronous alternation of cooperations and defections.
The actual payoffs received by traders in each trade cycle are determined as follows. A
trader receives a payoff of L, D, C, or H from each trade (PD game) in which he participates.
A trader also receives a rejection payoff, R <0, for each trade offer he submits that is refused;
the refuser receives no payoff from this interaction. If a trader neither submits nor accepts
any trade offers during a trade cycle, he receives a wallflower payoffs W < 0.
At the beginning of the initial trade cycle, before any actual trades have taken place, each
trader v associates an exogenously given prior expected payoff Uy{k) with each potential
trade partner k. Thus, a pure buyer associates a prior expected payoff with each seller, a
buyer-seller associates a prior expected payoff with each buyer and each seller, and a pure
seller associates a prior expected payoff with each buyer.
Throughout each trade cycle, each trader then uses a simple criterion filter to update his
current expected payoffs on the basis of the new payoffs he obtains frorn interactions with his
potential trade partners. In particular, if a trader v receives a payoff P from an interaction
with a potential trade partner k, then v forms an updated expected payoff for k by taking
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Table 1. Pseudo-Code Depiction of the TNG
int main () {
tnglult() ; // Specify prior expected payoffs and
// construct initial trader generation.
For (G = 0,...,GMAX-1) { // Enter the generation loop.
For (T = 0,...,TMAX-l) { // Enter the trade cycle loop.
MatchTraders() ; // Determine actual trade partners,
// given current expected payoffs, and
// record rejection and wallflower payoffs.
Trade () ; // Implement trades and
// r<;cord trade payoffs.
UpdateExpO ; // Lpdate expected payoffs on the
// Losis of newly recorded payoffs.
}
AssessFitness() ; // Assess and record fitness scores.
If (G < GMAX-1) {
EvolveGen() ; // Evolve the trade strategies of the




a convex combination of this new payoff P and his previous expected payoff for k. In this
way, trader v keeps a running tab on the payoff outcomes of his interactions with k, whether
these payoffs have resulted from a situation in which v acts as a buyer and fc as a seller or
vice versa. The implication is that trader v recognizes that his potential trade partner k
has a distinct (although a priori unknown) trading personality, even if k is encountered in
different types of trading activities. A more detailed discussion of the criterion filter used by
the traders to update their expected payoffs is given in Section 5.
At the end of a trade cycle loop, each trader is assigned a fitness score based on the
payoffs he has accumulated in past trades during the loop. The current generation of traders
is then evolved into a new generation of traders by means of a genetic algorithm that biases
reproduction in favor of fit traders. After memories have been appropriately reinitialized,
the new generation of traders engages in another trade cycle loop. The precise nature of this
genetic step is detailed in Section 6.
Apseudo-code depiction of the general logical progression of the TNG is given in Table 1.
Before entering into a more detailed discussion of implementation issues, various special cases
of the TNG will be presented to indicate the range of economic applications it encompasses.
3 Economic Applications
Five Special cases of tHe TNG will now be sketched." As these speciarcases illustrate, the
classification of traders as buyers and sellers is one simple'way that trade interactions can
be made to' reflect particular trading institutions.' Another way to incorporate institutional
structure, however, is to make use of the assurhption that a trader will not make an offer
to, or accept an offer from; a potential trade partner with whom he'associates an expected
payoff that falls below iis 'minimum tolerance level. In particular; no trade interactions will
ever take place between two traders if each trader judges the other trader to be intolerable
a priori. This feature is used in the fourth .special case to model a double auction game.
Cast 1: Job-Search Modelled as an N-Anhed Bandit Game with Choice and Refusal
The subset B consist's of one worker and the subset' S' consists of N —1 employers,
where B and S are disjoint. ' The worker can either submit a work offer to one of the
employers or choose to be unemployed and receive the known payoff 0. The employers can
refuse work offers. Once matched, a worker and employer play the following PD' game: the
worker decides whether to cooperate (exisrt high effort) or defect (exert low effort) on the
job, and the eniployer decides whether to cooperate with the worker (provide good working
conditions) or defect against the worker'(provide bad workifig conditions). Consequently,
information about productivity and working conditions gained from 6n-the-job experience
influences subsequent quits (failures' to renew bifers) by, the worker and layoffs (refusals of
renewed offers) by employers.
In the usual N-armed bandit problem, each^arm passively provides a random reward (see
Berry and Fristedt [3]). -This TNG special case thus represents an extension of the,N-armed
bandit problem to an N-armed bandit game in,which all'but one of the arms is an active
agent engaging in strategic decision making:
Case 2: A Labor Market Modelled as an Assignment Game with Choice and Refusal
The subset B consists of M workers and the subset S consists'of N employers, where B
and S are disjoint. Each worker m can submit work offers to a maximum of Dm employers,
or he can choose to be unemployed and receive the known payoff0. Each employer n can hire
up to An workers, and employers can refuse work'offers. As in the previous example, once
matched, a worker and employer engage in worksite interactions modelled as a PD game.
This TNG special case extends the usual assignment problem (cf. Gale and Shapley [8])
by incorporating subsequent strategic game plaj' between matched pairs of agents and by
having game play iterated over time. Assignment problems have been used b}' a number
of economists to model job-matching in labor markets (e.g., Crawford [5]) as well as other
economic processes; but the payoffs to each potential pair of partners are typically taken
to be given a priori. An interesting exception is the study by Kamecke [10], which extends
the assignment problem to an assignment game by assuming that matched partners must
subsequently split their realized gains from trade.
Case 3: A Labor Market with Endogenously Determined Workers and Employers
The subsets B and S coincide. Each trader i; in V can submit up to Oy work offers to
traders at other trade sites and receive up to Ay work offers at his own work site. The degree
to which any accepted work offer results in satisfactory outcomes for the participant traders
is determined by subsequent PD game play. Ex post, four pure types of traders can emerge:
(1) pure workers, who work at the trade sites of other traders but have no traders working
for them at their own trade sites; (2) pure employers, who have traders working for them at
their own trade sites but who do not work at the trade sites of other traders; (3) unemployed
traders, who submit at least one work offer to a trader at another trade site but who end up
neither working at other trade sites nor having traders working for them at their own trade
sites; and (4) inactive (out of the work force) traders, who neither submit nor accept any
work offers.
Case 4- A Double Auction Game with Choice and Refusal
Each trader can submit and receive trade offers, so that B and S coincide, and each
trader has a zero minimum tolerance level. The trader set V is partitioned into two subsets,
X and Y. Each trader in X is endowed with one unit of a good x of variable quality that
is potentially desired by the traders in V, and each trader in Y is endowed with one unit of
a good y of variable quality that is potentially desired by the traders in X. The exchange
rate of x for y is exogenously determined to be one for one. Each trader in X only assigns a
nonnegative prior expected payoff to traders in y, and vice versa. Consequently, the traders
in Y submit trade offers to, and accept trade offers from, the traders in X, and conversely,
but no trade interactions take-place among the traders in X or among the traders in i . The
actual value ofan accepted trade offer to the participant traders is determined by subsequent
PD game play, where cooperation denotes the provision of a high-quahty good and defection
denotes the provision of a low-quality good.
Case 5: An Industry Modelled as a Three-Sided Matching Game with Choice and Refusal
The buyer subset ^,and the seller subset S overlap but do not coincide. Thepure buyers
in y —5 represent "households," the buyer-sellers in 5 PI 5 represent "producers.' and the
pure sellers in V—B represent "input suppliers." The households submit product orders
to producers, who either accept or refuse them, and the producers submit input orders to
input suppliers, who either accept or refuse them. The degree to which the accepted orders
are satisfactorily fulfilled is determined by subsequent PD game play.
4 Determination of Trade Partners
Thissection first explains the deferred choice andrefusal (DCR) mechanism that theTNG
traders use to determine their submission, acceptance, and refusalof trade offers in each trade
cycle. It is then established that the trade partner match-ups that result under the DCR
mechanism possess various stability', social bptimality, and uniqueness properties. Although
trades in the TNG are interpreted as prisoner's dilemma games; the DCR mechanism does
not depend on this interpretation.
For any trader v in V, let Ty denote trader u's minimum tolerance level, and let Uv{k) de
note the expected payoff that trader v currently associates with a potential trade partner k.
Trader k will be called tolerahle'ior trader v if and only if Uv(k) > r„. Also, given any two po
tential trade partners k' and k"^ trader v will be said to strictly prefer to trade with k' rather
than with k" if Uv(k') > Uv(k") and to equally prefer trades with k' and k" if Uv{k') = Uv(k").
> r • \
The DCR Mechanism In Any Trade Cycle T;
Step 1: Each buyer m submits trade offers to a maximum of 0^ most preferred sellers that
he finds tolerable, with at most one trade offer going to any one seller. Each seller n
then selects up to An most preferred trade offers received from tolerable buyers and
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places these offers on a waiting-list. Seller n refuses all other trade offers received in
Step 1. Traders use random selection to break ties among equally-preferred trades.
Step K {K >2) : If r sellers refused trade offers from buyer m in Step A'—1. then buyer m
submits up to r replacement trade offers in Step K to the most preferred and tolerable
sellers who have not refused a trade offer from him during Steps 1 A' —1. Each
seller n then selects up to most preferred and tolerable trade offers from among both
the new trade offers he receives in Step K and the trade offers already on his waiting-
list from Step K —1, and he refuses the rest. These selected trade offers constitute
seller n's waiting-list for Step K. Traders use random selection to break ties among
tolerable equally-preferred trades.
Final Step: Step K* is the final step if and only if no new trade offers are submitted in Step
K" -h 1. If Step K' is the final step, each seller accepts all trade offers on his Step A'
waiting-list.
Under the DCR mechanism, two traders v and k can engage in zero, one, or two trades
with each other in each trade cycle. Zero trades occur when neither trader submits an
accepted trade offer to the other; one trade occurs when only one of the traders submits an
accepted trade offer to the other; and two trades occur when each trader submits an accepted
trade offer to the other. The latter case can only occur if v and k are both buyer-sellers.
In particular, v must be acting as the buyer and k as the seller in one of the trades, and
conversely for the second trade; for, by assumption, only buyers can submit trade offers, and
a buyer can submit at most one trade offer to any one seller in any given trade cycle.
Note, also, that Step K" is the final step of the DCR mechanism in trade cycle T if and
only if each buyer m either has had no trade offer refused in Step A'", and hence has no desire
to submit a new trade offer in Step K' + 1, or is unable to submit a new trade offer in Step
K" 1 because each seller that buyer m finds tolerable has already received a trade offer
from him sometime during Steps 1,...,A''. The first.proposition provides an upper bound
for A'*. The proofs for this and all subsequent.propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 4.1. Let M denote the number of buyers in the buyer set B, and let N
denote the number of sellers in the seller set S. In each trade cycle T, the DCR mechanism
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always ends at some Step K' occurring on or before'Step'MN.
' DEF!CVITION 4.1. A buyer m and seller n will be said to form a match.'m trade cycle
r, denoted by (m, n), if buyer m is tolerable for seller n, seller n is tolerable for buyer m,
and buyer m and seller n engage in a trade during trade cycle T. A matching outconu for
trade cycle T is then any hsting of distinct matches (m, n) for trade cycle T such that each
buyer m appears at most Om times in the first^position and each seller n appears at most
An times in the second position. By construction, then, a matching outcome for trade cycle
I '' *
J* is a Ust of trades that could feasibly take place during this cycle.
Note that the trades determined in any trade cycle T by the DCR mechanism always
constitute a matching outcome for trade cycle T, in the sense of Definition 4.1.
DEFIT^TION 4.2. (cf. Gale and Shapley [8, p. 10]) A matching outcome G for trade
cycle T will be called unstable if the.following conditions hold'for some buyer m and seller
n: • •
(a) m and n are not matched under G;
(b) m would prefer to be matched with n, in the sense that either there exists a match
(m,n') under G such that Um{n) > or m is matched with fewer than
sellers under G and ^
(c) n would prefer to be matched with m, in the sense that either there exists a match [m', n)
under G such that f7n(m) > or n is matched with fewer than An buyers under
G and Un(Tn) > t„.
A matching outcome G for trade cycle T will be called (pairwise) stable if no such buyer m
and seller n exist.
Intuitively, given conditions, (a), (b), and (c), the buyer m and seller n could block the
implementation of the matching outcome. G by agreeing to.play each other,instead. Roth
and Sotomayor [16] are careful to differentiate between group stable and pairwise stable
matching outcomes, whereby the former they mean a matching outcome that is not blocked
by any coalition of agents. In the TNG. each trader is assumed to have a preference ranking
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only over pairwise matches with other traders, and this preference ranking is unaffected by
who else might be trading with these potential trade partners. Consequently, a matching
outcome in the TNG is group stable if and only if it is also pairwise stable. Without risk
of confusion, then, the qualifier "pairwise" will be omitted in all subsequent references to
stable matching outcomes, .
DEFINITION 4.3. A matching outcome G for trade cycle T will be called B-opthnal
if: (a) G is a stable matching outcome; and (b) each buyer matched under G is at least as
well off under G as under any other stable matching outcome.
It will now be shown, in several stages, that the DCR mechanism always yields a B-
optimal matching outcome for each trade cycle T of the TNG if each buyer (seller) has a
strict preference ranking over the sellers (buyers) he finds tolerable. Moreover, the B-optimal
matching outcome is unique. The proof is a generalization of the optimality proof provided
in Gale and Shapley [8, Thm. 2, p. 14] for their college admissions problem with B disjoint
from S and offer quotas 0^ = 1 for all agents m in B] see also Roth and Sotomayor [16,
Chapter 5 .
PROPOSITION 4.2. Any matching outcome generated via the DCR mechanism is
stable.
PROPOSITION 4.3. Suppose each buyer (seller) has a strict preference ranking over
the sellers (buyers) he finds tolerable. Then the DCR mechanism yields the unique B-optimal
matching outcome.
5 Determination of Updated Expected Payoffs
Each TNG trader is assumed to use a simple criterion filter^ to update his expected
payoffs as new payolfs are obtained. As will be clarified below, this criterion filter is neutral
with regard to the specific way in which the payoffs are generated, implying in particular that
^As detailed in Tesfatsion [20, 21], a criterion filter is an algorithm for the direct updating of an expected
return function on the basis of past return outcomes, without recourse to the usual interim updating of
probability ^sessments via Bayes' rule.
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it would remain applicable-under alternative specifications for the trade partner"matching
mechanism.
Suppose traders v and k are potential trade partners at some point in time during a trade
cycle. Let,t/„{fc) deno^ u's current expected payoff for engaging in a trade with k. and let
Ny{k) denote the, number of pay9ffs that v has-received to date^from interactions w.ith k.
Suppose Vnow interacts with k and receives a payoff P from this interaction. For example.
. ifVsubmits a trade, offer to k, whosubsequently either accepts or refuses it. then P is either
a PD-game payoff, or the rejection payoff R. Alternatively, if v accepts a trade offer from k,
, then P is a PD-game payoff.^
It is-assumed that trader v uses this payoff P, first^ to update his current payoff count
N^(k) with .fc, and then to update, his current expected payoff l/v(k) for engaging in a trade
with k, as follows: . • .
N,(k) ''^ Nl(k) +1; : ' ''' (2)
l/,(k) ^ u:,{k)U^{k}-h [l ~u;4k)]P , ' (3)
where the memory weight Lijy{k) Hes in the interval [0,1]. An increase in implies an
increase in the weight-put on past payoffs relative to-current payoffs from interactions with
'trader k. 'Thus, larger memory weights 'lead to-more inertia in-the trade partner selection
process. Indeed, if all memory weights are set at 1.0, expected payoffs stay forever at their
'• prior levels. i >
In Stanley et al. [19], Ashlock et al; [2], and'Siiiucker et al. [18], it is assumed that each
• trader makes use df' the same fixed memory weight u; in'i(0,"l). Under this constant-gain
specification for (3), each trader strictly'discounts past 'payoffs relative to recent payoffs
when assessing his expected" payoff for a current potential trade partner. For example, if
Uu{k) denotes trader u's expected'payoff'for a potential trade partner k at the beginning of
trade cycle T'+ 1, and one-payoff has been obtained by v from intieractions with k in each of
the trade cycles T,T—1T—J, then theweight 'assigned by Uv{k)' to the payoff received
in trade cycle T —J is'w^fl —a»], a strictly"decreasing function"of J. . ' '
In contrast, for the T.NG it is assumed' that each trader v gives equal -weight to each
payoff that he has obtained in previous interactions with a potential trade partner k. In
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particular, it is assumed that the memory weight in (3) takes the form
= N,{k)/lN,{k) +1] , • (4)
where Nv{k) denotes u's payoff count with k after the realization of the latest payoff P.
Given the variable-gain specification (4), it becomes increasingly difficult for current payoffs
to affect the expected payoffs of traders as payoff histories accumulate.
By assumption, the trade strategies that characterize the trade behavior of any two
potential trade partners v and k in repeated trades have finite memory depth. That is. the
moves dictated for v and k in any current trade can depend at most on the last L pairs of
moves they have made in previous trades with each other, for some fixed finite integer L. It
follows that the sequence of payoffs received by v and k in repeated trades must eventually
enter into a cycle of period no greater than 4^, the maximum number of distinct memories
(payoff histories) concerning their own past trades that the two traders can have in any
given current trade. The memory weight specification (4) thus results in expected payoffs
that converge to the true average payoff obtained by v in interactions with k as the number
of interactions between v and k becomes arbitrarily large.
Finally, note that the criterion filter (3) is neutral with regard to the particular trade
partner selection mechanism used to generate payoff histories. For example, under the DCR
mechanism described in Section 4, each trader exploits his current expected payoff informa
tion, in the sense that he uses this information to submit offers to, or accept offers from,
his currently most preferred trade partners. Exploration occurs only as a by-product of this
exploitation, to the extent that the quotas placed on the trade offers that can be submit
ted and accepted by buyers and sellers permit each trader to have multiple trade partners.
Alternatively, it could be assumed that the traders use a mechanism for determining their
trade partners that guarantees a more thorough exploration of their current expected payoff
information—e.g., a mechanism, analogous to the learning algorithm set out in Arthur [1]^
under which the probability a trader v submits an offer to, or accepts an offer from, a poten
tial trade partner k is an increasing function of Uy{k). The criterion filter (3) for updating
expected payoffs can be applied in either case.
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6 Representation and Evolution of Trade Strategies
j . '"i ' • . • •
During the course of each trade cycle loop", the traders'gather'and exploit information
from interactions with potential trade partners in' order to improve their selection of future
trade partners; but the basic trade, strategy, of each trader remains fixed. The.evolution
of trade strategies that occurs in the genetic step at the end of each trade cycle loop is
meant to capture the manner in which traders -make potentially significant changes in their
current trade'behavior based on past trade experiences; both their own and that of other
traders. In effect, successful trade strategies are mimicked and unsuccessful trade strategies
are abandoned. • '
To faciUtate comparisons with previous work, the trade strategies of the TNG traders
are currently represented-and evolved using the same finite state machine, fitness definition,
and genetic algorithm as used in Stanley et al..[19] and Ashlopk et al. [2] for the IPD/CR
game. This section briefly reviews.these specifications. As will be discussed at the end of this
review, some of these specifications will eventually be modified to capture more adequately
the specifically economic nature.of the TNG apphcations.
Each of the |y| traders in the initial trader generation is assigned a trade strategy, i.e.,
a finite-memory pure strategy for playing a PD ganie against-an arbitrary opponent an
indefinite number of times. These trade strategies are represented as Mealy finite state
machines [15] with a predetermined .starting state 1, which will hereafter be referred to as
IPD machines.^ • • , , • > , .
Figure 1 depicts the IPD machine representations ;for two. possible trade strategies: a
nice strategy, Tit-for-Two-Tats (T^FTT),' &nd an,.opportunistically defecting strategy, ./2zp-
,Off (Rip). As seen in Figure 1(a), TFTT starts with cooperation and enters the initial state
1. In state 1, if the opponent's last,move was cooperation, TFTT, cooperates and stays in
.. state 1; otherwise, TFTT cooperates and enters .state 2. In state 2, if the opponent's last
^Formally, an IPD machine is characterized'by a six-tuple A,/), where: M = {c,c/} is the
set consisting of the two possible moves for each PD game play, either cooperate c or defect d; mi G M is
an initizil move;-5 is a finite set of internal'states; 1 € 'S is the steirtirig state resulting from the initial move
mi; A :5 X M —• M is an output function indicating the next move to be taken as a function of the current
state and the last move of one's opponent; ajid fiS xMxM-^5 is a state transition function indicating
the next state as a function of the current state, the last move of one's opponent;,and the next move to be
taken. See Ashlock et al. [2] for a more detailed discussion of IPD machines.
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move was cooperation, TFTT cooperates and enters state 1; otherwise. TFTT defects and
stays in state 2. Consequently, TFTT gives a defecting trade partner one additional chance
to cooperate before retaliating with a defection.
As seen in Figure 1(b), Rip starts with a defection and enters the initial state 1. In state
1, if the opponent's last move was a defection. Rip cooperates and enters state 3: otherwise.
Rip cooperates and enters state 2. In state 2, if the opponent's last move was cooperation.
Rip defects and enters state 1: otherwise. Rip cooperates and enters state 3. Finally, in
state 3, if the opponent's last move was cooperation. Rip cooperates and stays in state 3:
otherwise, Rip defects and stays in state 3. Hence, once in state 3, i.e., once an opponent has
made a retaliatory defection in response to his own defection. Rip plays Tit-for-Tat aaainsl
his opponent.
— INSERT FIGURE I ABOUT HERE—
As this representation for trade strategies implies, the only information a trader i' has
about a current trade partner k that affects f's choice of move for this trade is his trade
history with k. If no previous trades with k have taken place, the IPD machine determines
an initial move for trader v. Otherwise, trader v's trade history with k determines the state
that X' is currently in with respect to k and what move was taken by k in his laust trade wnth
V. Trader f's IPD machine then determines what move v should take in the current trade.
Ai the end of the initial trade cycle loop, a genetic algorithm involvingelitism, recombina
tion, and mutation is used to evolve the current collection of IPD machines (trade strategies)
assigned to the first trader generation. Roughly stated (cf. Goldberg [9, pp. 13-24]), eHtism
preserves successful move combinations, recombination rearranges blocks of move combi
nations without disruption of the blocks, and mutation changes individual moves. Thus,
recombination and mutation both generate new move combinations with which the traders
can experiment, but recombination globally reconfigures strategies whereas mutation locally
reconfigures strategies. Each trader is then assigned one of these evolved IPD machines,
reinitialized to the starting state 1, and his expected payoffs are reinitialized to his prior
expected payoffs. In effect, then, the traders' memories are wiped clean of all knowledge of
previous game plays. This new generation of traders then engages in another trade cycle
loop, and the whole process repeats.
More precisely, the evolution of the traders' IPD machines at the end of each trade cycle
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loop is accomplished as follows. Each trader-in the' current trader generation is assigned
a, fitness score, taken to be the totaj sum of his payoffs-divided by the,total number of
his payoffs. The total number of a trader's payoffs is a count ,of all .trade, rejection, and
wallflower payoffs .that he has received during the course of the previous trade cycle loop. The
inclusion of wallflower payoffs in this, count discourages traders from evolving into hermits
after attaining high,payoffs early in the game.
The X most-fit traders'in the current generation, the elite, are retained unchanged for
the next generation, and the \V\.~ X least-fit traders have their lPD machines replaced
by "offspring" of the IPD machines of selected "parent" •traders.; These.parent traders are
selected by means of a roulette wheel procedure [9, p.. 237]. Two parent traders are selected
(IV| —X)/2 times from-among the |V| traders, where the probability of a trader's selection
is an increasing function of his, relative fitness score.® Since the selection is with replacement,
a parent trader is allowed to.mate with a.clone of himself.
The recombination-<of. the IPD machines associated with any two parent traders is ac
complished via one-point crossover. For example, suppose that each IPD machine-has 16
states. Each of these IPD machines would then be coded as a string consisting of 161 bits:
one bit for the initial move; four bits to, represent the destination state of each of the 32
state transition arrows; and one bit for each?.of the 32 arrow labels to indicate the move of
the trader given the previous move oLhis opponent. (The move of the opponent is indicated
by position in the bit string.) A random variable q is generated that is distributed uniformly
over the discrete range 1,2,..., 161. The bits in positions q through 161 of the parental bit
strings are exchanged'«to.obtain the bit strings for two offspring.
Next, the bit string of each offspring is subjected to mutation. For the initial move and
the 32 arrow labels, each bit is flipped, with probability //. For the 32 state transition arrows,
selection of any one of the arrows (i.e. all four bits) for mutation occurs with probability //;
and, once a state transition arrow has been selected for mutation, a uniformly distributed
random value is selected from the discrete range 1,2, ...,16 and .coded as a new four-bit
®In Stanley et al. [19] and Ashlock et al. [2], the populationsizeis generally taken to be 30with a relatively
large elite {X = 20), arid parents are selected exclusively from ariiong the elite. In inany genetic algorithm
studies, however, the elite is taken to be a much smaller proportion of the population, and it then makes
less sense to restrict parent selection only to the ehte. ' • i •
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representation for the state transition arrow.®
The evolution of trade strategies in the genetic step is meant to capture the manner in
which traders mimic successful trade strategies and abandon trade strategies which have
not been successful. Given this "cultural transmission" interpretation of reproduction, it
may not be sensible to retain the IPD/CR assumption that the traders lose all memory
of previous trades as they pass through the genetic step. In particular, it may be more
reasonable to suppose that the expected payoffs which ehte traders currently associate with
other elite traders at the end of one trade cycle loop are carried over into the next, whereas
the memories of offspring are either partially or completely cleansed of all of their parents'
knowledge of prior trading activities.
Also, in the IPD/CR game the PD-game payoffs are assumed to be nonnegative (e.g.,
L' = 0, D" = 1, C" = 3, and H' = 5). The fitness score of each player is then defined to be
his average payoff per payoff received in order to prevent players from having an incentive
to maximize their payoff counts regardless of the nature of the payoffs received. The latter
difficulty does not arise in the TNG, however, because the PD-game payoffs are normalized
about zero. A more natural definition of fitness for the economic applications encompassed
by the TNG would then be to calculate a trader's fitness score as his total net accumulated
payoffs (profits) rather than his average payoff per payoff received.
These genetic step modifications will be investigated once basic comparative IPD/CR
studies are complete.
7 An Illustrative Five-Trader TNG
This section sets out an illustrative 5-trader TNG with specifications chosen to permit
comparisons with the 5-player IPD/CR game analyzed in Stanley et al. [19, pp. 153-156].
Consider a TNG for which the trader set V = B = S contains a total of five buyer-seller
traders and the wallflower payoff is set to W = 0. Each trader u in V' has the same minimum
®Since this mutation procedure is followed in Stanley et al. [19] and Ashlock et al. [2], it is retained here
for comparison purposes. Under this procedure, the initial move, the destination states, and the arrow labels
of an IPD machine are each mutated with equal probability. In the GA literature, however, in analogy with
the way mutation is thought to occur in actual biological genomes, it is typically the bits in the bit-string
encoding that ase mutated with equal probability, not the macro phenomena which they encode.
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tolerance level, = 0, and assigns a negative .prior expected payoff to trade with himself. In
addition, eadi trader has the same quotas, Oy = 1and = 4, on the number of trade offers
he can submit and accept in any given trade cycle. Thus, each trader-can have at most one
outstanding trade offer at any one time; but each trader is effectively unconstrained with
regard to the number of trade offers, he can have on his current,-waiting-list, for he receives
at most four trade offers during.the course of any one trade cycle.
With regard to trade strategies, three of the traders are TFTTs and the,remaining two
traders areRips. As detailed inSection 6and illustrated in Figure 1, a TFTT is a nice trader
who starts by cooperating, subsequently defects only if his opponent defects twice in a row.
and reverts back to cooperation as soon as his'opponent cooperates. On the other hand, a
Rip is an opportunistic trader who starts with a defection and then alternately cooperates
and defects as long his tradepartner does not punish him with a retaliatory defection. Once
he has been defected against, a Rip reverts to Tit-for-Tat play in all subsequent trades. A
TFTT receives a paybff sequence (C,C,C,...) in repeated trades with another TFTT and
a payoff sequence (L, C, L,C,...) in repeated trades with a Rip, and a Rip receives a payoff
sequence (i/, C, i?,C,...) in repeated trades with a TFTT and a payoff sequence (D, C, C,...)
in repeated trades with another Rip^ where the payoffs satisfy L<D<0<C<B with
(L + H)/2 < 0. It is also assumed that the rejection payoff, i?, is strictly negative.
Note that a Rip never triggers defection in a TFTT since a Rip never defects twice in a
row. 'Consequently, in any match-up between a TFTT and a Rip, the Rip would definitely
attain a higher fitness score than the TFTT if the TFTT were not permitted to refuse the
Rip's trade offers.
One key model feature that affects the emergence of trade networks in the TNG is
the specification of the traders' prior expected payoffs. Low prior expected payoffs induce
traders to latch on to the first trade' partner from whom they receive even a modestly high
payoff and to refuse all but the very best trade offers they receive. On the other hand,
high prior expected payoffs encourage traders to experiment continually with new trade
partners in the face of disappointing payoffs from current trade partners but also lessen the
chances that received"trade offers will be refused. As will be seen' below for the TFTTs, the
experimentation induced by^high prior expected payoffs can be detrimental to nice traders
since it increases their chances of encountering opportunistically defecting trade partners
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whose defections are infrequent enough to avoid triggering refusals.
Two alternative benchmark assumptions will be considered for the traders' prior expected
payoffs, Uy{k)^ for their potential trade partners. The first assumption.-a common prior, is
the assumption made in Stanley et al. [19], Ashlock et al. [2], and Smucker et al. [18] for
the IPD/CR. The second assumption, long-run expectations, sets the prior expected payoffs
that any two potential trade partners have for each other equal to the true long-run average
payoffs that result when these two traders engage in repeated trades.
Assumption (CP): Common Prior. Each trader associates the same prior expected
payoff, C/°, with each other trader, where lies in the open interval from 0 (the minimum
tolerance level) to H (the highest possible trade payoff).
Assumption (LR): Long-Run Expectations. Each TFTT associates a prior ex
pected payoff C with each other TFTT and a prior expected payoff (L -{• C)/2 with each
Rip; and each Rip associates a prior expected payoff (H + C)/2 with each TFTT and a prior
expected payoff C with each other Rip.
Another key factor affecting the types of trade networks that can emerge in the TNG
is the extent to which the benefits and costs associated with each potential trade partner
balance out over time, either triggering eventual refusal or permitting long-term partnership.
It is therefore useful to examine in some detail the various possible 2-trader match-ups for
the illustrative 5-trader TNG before entering into an analysis of the full-blown model.
By assumption, the traders update their expected payoffs using the criterion filter (3)
with memory weights defined as in (4). Consequently, a TFTT never judges another TFTT
to be intolerable, for the expected payoff of a TFTT for another TFTT is always nonnegative.
Similarly, a Rip never judges a TFTT to be intolerable. But what happens in a 2-trader
match-up between two Rips," or between a TFTT and a Rip? Can a Rip ever become
intolerable for another Rip or for a TFTT?
Under either (CP) or (LR), the two Rips have the same positive prior expected payoff
for each other, either or C\ let this prior be denoted by U%{R). If (U^(R) + £)) < 0,
each Rip finds the other Rip intolerable as soon as he has engaged in one trade with him.
Otherwise, however, a Rip nevers find another Rip intolerable.
Now consider a match-up between a TFTT and a Rip. Under either (CP) or (LR), all
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TFTT traders associate the.same prior expected payoff with each Rip, either C/° or (Z,+C)/2.
and all Rip traders associate the same prior expected payoff with each TFTT, .either or
{H + C)/2. Let these priors be denoted by .U^{R) and respectively. Suppose that a
TFTT and a Rip have previously engaged in exactly N successive trades with each other,
TV > 0, without any refusals having yet' taken place.' For even 'the current expected payoff
of the TFTT for the^Rip then takes the form
U^{R) =
and for odd N it takes the form
U^{R) =
U^{T) =
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Note that (R) converges to {L + C)/2 and {T) converges to {H+ C)/2 as the number
of trades, N. becomes arbitrarily large, regardless of the precise form' of the.prior expected
payoffs.
If {U^{R)-\-L) < 0, it follows .from (6) with ='l that each TFTT finds, a Rip intolerable
after only one trade. If 0 < {U^{R) + L) and (L + C) < 0, then each TFTT finds a Rip
intolerable after some finite odd,number of trades. To see this, note from (6) and (5) that
Ut{R) cLsymptotically approaches the value (L -f- C)/2 < 0 for large N; but, since even-
numbered trades always result in a strictly positive mutual cooperation payoff C for TFTT,
the first drop below zeromust occurafter an odd-numbered trade. Finally, if 0 < (U^{R)-\-L)
I • _ • > • I I ' '
and 0 < (L + C), then is clear from (6) and (5) that a TFTT never judges a Rip to be
intolerable. In this case it is possible for a Rip to become a long-term parasite on a host
TFTT, in the sense that the Rip manages to defect in every other trade against a consistently
cooperating TFTT without inducing the TFTT to refuse his future trade offers.
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Making use of these observations, together with the form of the prior expected payoffs
under assumptions (CP) and (LR), the parameter space for this illustrative TNG can be
partitioned into regions where the behavior of the traders takes on qualitatively different
characteristics. In particular, under (CP) one obtains the following four behavioral regions
as the commonly shared prior expected payoff ranges from low to high values:
(CP.l) 0 < U° < —D: a TFTT finds a Rip intolerable after only one trade, and
a Rip finds another Rip intolerable after only one trade;
(CP.2) —D < < —L: a TFTT finds a Rip intolerable after onlj^ one trade,
and a Rip never finds another Rip intolerable;
(CP.3) —L < and C < —L: a TFTT finds a Rip intolerable after a finite
odd number of trades, and a Rip never finds another Rip intolerable;
(CP.4). -L < and —L < C: a TFTT never finds a Rip intolerable, and a
Rip never finds another Rip intolerable.
hi contrast, under (LR) one obtains four behavioral regions characterized by somewhat
different transient behaviors as the mutual cooperation payoff C ranges from low to high
values:
(LR.1) 0 < C < —-D: a TFTT finds a Rip intolerable prior to trade, and a Rip
finds another Rip intolerable after only one trade;
(LR.2) —D <C< —L: a TFTT finds a Rip intolerable prior to trade, and a
Rip never finds another Rip intolerable;
(LR.3) ~L < C < —3L: a TFTT finds a Rip intolerable after only one trade,
and a Rip never finds another Rip intolerable;
(LR.4) —3L < C: a TFTT never finds a Rip intolerable, and a Rip never finds
another Rip intolerable.
For later purposes, several additional observations will also be of use. Suppose a Rip has
traded N times with one TFTT and K times with a different TFTT, without being refused








If N and K axe both odd^it follows from (8) that
A(N.,K) = ,,-[C'UUT)] . .. , (10)
(iV-M)(A' + l) ^ 'V
Finally, for any N and /ST, if Rip trades once more with the first TFTT, receiving a payoff
pN+i from this trade, then
/pN+l _ TJ^'(T\\•''A{N+1,K) =A(iV,A';).-+ (yv +a) j • •
. ; , ,, n - . ' .t . , '
What, then, are the possible trade networks that can emerge in this 5-trader TNG over
the course of a single trade cycle loop, assuming either (CP)|Or (LR) is in effect?
7.1 Possible Trade Networks Under Assumption (CP)
At the beginning of the initial trade cycle, each trader judges' each other trader to be
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equally tolerable, and he uses random selection to submit .a"trade offer to one of these
traders. lii turn, each trader places'all received trade orders on his current waiting-list, with
no refusals. In accordance with the DCR mechanism, each^trader then accepts all trade
offers on his current waiting-list. • • I'-i . I.
Suppose that payoffs and' prior: expected'payoffs are configured as in (CP.l). In this
case, even though a Rip receives the highest possible payoff, H, from an initial trade with
a TFTT, which encourages him to submit another trade offer to this TFTT in the next
trade cycle, the TFTT neither submits trade offers to, nor accept, trade-offers from, this Rip
after their first trade. Moreover, the two Rips-cease^all trade activity with each other after
their first trade. Under the DCR mechanism, a trader receivings a rejection payoff from a
refused trade offer during the course of a trade cycle immediately submits a replacement
trade offer to any next-most-preferred trader who has not yet'refused him. Consequently, by
the end of the first four trade cycles; a Rip has triggered refusal in every one of his'potential
trade partners.' Thereafter the Rip submits trade offers'only to the TFTTS, receiving only
negative rejection payoffs in return, until the expected payoff he associates with each TFTT
-finally drops below zero and he turns into a wallflower.
In summary, by the end of the fourth trade cycle, the only trade networks that are
ft I \ ^ ; I
viable for case (CP.l) involve trades among the three TFTTs, with both Rips ostracized
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and eventually reduced to wallflowers; cf. Figure 2(a). The fitness score of each TFTT
thus tends towards the mutually cooperative payoff, C. whereas the fitness score of each
Rip tends toward the wallflower payoff, 0. Whether of not the Rips survive and prosper in
the genetic step at the end of the trade cycle loop then depends on the length of this loop.
Specifically, in order for a Rip to end up with a higher fitness score than the TFTTs. the loop
must be short enough so that the H payoffs received by the Rip from his initial successful
defections against the three TFTTs suflBcientlv outweigh the mutual defection payoff. D.
that he receives from his one Rip-Rip trade, any rejection payoffs, R, that he receives from
subsequent refused attempts to trade with the TFTTs. and any wallflower payoffs. 0, that
he receives after ceasing all trade activity.
—INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE—
Cases (CP.2) and (CP.3) are similar to case (CP.l). except that the two Rips end up
trading cooperatively with each other rather than as wallflowers; cf. Figure 2(b). Also, in
case (CP.3) the TFTTs may take longer to reject the opportunistically defecting Rips. The
fitness scores of all traders thus tend toward the mutually cooperative payoff, C, but it is
now more hkely that the Rips will have a higher fitness score than the TFTTs at the end
of any given trade cycle loop and hence a reproductive advantage in the subsequent genetic
step. For example, given = \. H = 2, C = \, D = —1. L = —12, and R = —19/6. the
fitness score of each Rip exceeds the fitness score of each TFTT by the end of the fifth trade
cycle and remains higher in all subsequent trade cycles.
Suppose, now, that case (CP.4) holds with' —L < < (// 4- C)/2. As established
in the following proposition, the only long-run trade networks viable in this case consist of
the three TFTTs engaged in mutually cooperative trades with other TFTTs, with each Rip
latched on to one randomly determined TFTT. [Figure 2(c) depicts the case in which each
Rip happens to be latched on to a different TFTT.] The proof of this proposition and all
subsequent propositions in this section rely heavily on relations (9) through (11). These
proofs are given in the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 7.1. Suppose case (CP.4) holds with -L < < (// + C)/2. Then,
by at most the end of the fourth trade cycle, all traders submit their trade offers only to other
^Note that 0 < C + L and C < H implies that —L < [H + C)/2.
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TFTTs. Moreover, given a sufficiently long trade cycle loop,-.each Rip ultimately submits all
of his trade offers to only one TFTT, determined by chance.
In this case, then, each ,TFXT risks becoming a full-time host.for a parasitical,Rip. Prior
expected payoffs are low enough to encourage latching behavior on the part of the-Rips, who
are delighted with their-unexpectedly high-payoffs'from the TFTTs; but not low eiiough to
induce the TFTTs to refuse the 'Rips. Although the average payoff, {L+ C)/2, that a TFTT
receives from repeated trades with'a <Rip is nonnegative and possibly positive, it is not as
high as the average payoff accruing to a Rip from such trades, {H+ C)/2\ nor as high as the
average payoff, C, that accrues to a TFTT in repeated trades with another TFTT. Hence,
the relative fitness of a TFTT is lowered by interactions with a Rip, and this puts him at a
I ' ' ') . . • ' . '
reproductive disadvantage in the genetic step.
It is interesting to note that at least one TFTT always avoids becoming parasitized by
a Rip in case (CP.4) with —L < U° < (H + C)/2. The fitness score of any such TFTT
tends towards C, whereas the fitness'score of" each parasitized TFTT is'uniformly bounded
below C. The structurally identical TFTT traders thus end up, by chance, with different
fitness scores. Nevertheless, given a' sufficiently long trade cycle loop," each Rip exits the loop
with a higher'fitness score than each TFTT; for the fitness score of eiach Rip tends towards
Next, consider case (CPi4) with U^'= {H-^C)/2. In this case, as estabhshed in the next
proposition and depicted in Figure 2(d), each Rip stochastically switches his trade offers
back and forth among the three TFTTs for the duration of the trade cycle loop. Hence, each
TFTT always has a positive'probabihty of being parasitized by-each Rip; The reason for
the formation of this type of trade"network'is evident from relation (9): a Rip is indifferent
' between any two TFTTs with whom he has traded an even, number, of times. • '
PROPOSITION 7.2. Suppose case (CP.4) holds with = {H C)/2. Then, by at
most the end of the fourth trade cycle, all TFTTs submit their trade offers only to TFTTs,
and both Rips ultimately submit their irade offers only to TFTTs. In particular, apart from
one encounter with the other Rip, determined by chance, each Rip submits a trade offer
to a randomly selected TFTT after every even-numbered trade with a TFTT, trading two
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successive times with this selected TFTT.
Finally, consider case (CP.4) with {H -\-C)l2 < < H. As established in the following
proposition and depicted in Figure 2(d), each TFTT is now a recurrent host for each of the
parasitical Rips by the end of the fourth trade cycle. The intuitive reason for the formation
of this type of trade network is evident from relations (9) through (11): each Rip's prior
expected payoff for a TFTT is so high that he essentially always prefers the TFTT with
whom he has currently traded the least, and this leads him to repeatedly cycle his trade
oifers among the three TFTTs.
PROPOSITION 7.3. Suppose case (CP.4) holds with (i/ + C)/2 < < H. Then, by
at most the end of the sixth trade cycle, all traders submit their trade offers only to TFTTS.
In particular, each Rip repeatedly cycles his trade offers among the three TFTTs in randomly
determined order.
As in the previous (CP.4) cases, the fitness score of each Rip in this final (CP.4) case
tends toward {H + C)/2. In contrast to the previous (CP.4) cases, however, no TFTT
now has any chance of escaping parasitization by all three Rips. Consequently, the fitness
score of all three TFTTs is uniformly bounded below C for all sufficiently long trade cycle
loops. Here, then, is an example where optimistic prior expectations, leading to increased
experimentation, turn out to be detrimental for the nicer traders.
7.2 Possible Trade Networks Under Assumption (LR)
Comparing the behavioral regions under (LR) with the behavioral regions under (CP),
one sees that the TFTTs tend to behave more cautiously under (LR) because their prior
expected payoffs are less optimistic. In particular, a TFTT's prior expected payoff for a Rip
is bounded strictly below C under (LR) and may even be negative. Consequently, no TFTT
ever submits a trade offer to a Rip. Moreover, a TFTT will not even accept an initial trade
offer from a Rip under (LR) unless the benefit, C, from a mutual cooperation is at least as
great as the magnitude of the cost, —L, that is incurred when the Rip successfully defects
against him.
Moreover, a TFTT will not sustain any kind of a long-run trade partnership with a Rip
27
unless the actual benefitrcost ratio, Cl\~-L], that results from trading with the Rip is at
least 3.0. In contrast, the requirements for sustaining a long-run trade partnership between
a TFTT and a Rip under (CP) are that the prior expected payoff be at least as great as
—L and that the actual benefit-cost'ratio (7/[—X] experienced by the TFTT in trades with
this Rip be at least 1.0. This illustrates how anoptimistic prior expected payoff cancushion a
trader against negative payoffs in the early stages of trading, sustaining this trading through
the period when average payoffs tend to be most volatile. With more pessimistic priors, a
higher benefit-cost'ratio ma}*" be needed to sustain trading.
On the other hand,' under (LR), a Rip's" prior expected payoff, C, for the other Rip
presumes that mutual cooperation will prevail in the long run. If C is at least as great as
the magnitude of the cost, —D^ experienced in the first trade with the other Rip, a long-
run trade partnership between the two Rips can be sustained; otherwise, the Rips will both
judge each other to be intolerable after onlyone trade. Consequently," a Rip's trade behavior
with another Rip under (LR) is entirely determined by whether or not C/[—j9] exceeds
1.0 whereas, under-(CP), it is entirely determined .by whether or not U^l[—D] exceeds 1.0
regardless of the size of C/[—D]. The latter observation' again illustrates how an optimistic
prior expected-payoff can cushion a trader'against negative payoffs'in the early stages of
trading. This cushioning is beneficial in the case of the Rips; for the'negative payoff each
Rip receives in his "first trade with another Rip is not representative of the positive mutual
cooperation payoffs he-receives in'subsequent Rip-Rip trades, payoffs that may be necessary
if a Rip's long-run fitness is to exceed that of the TFTTs.
Consider, now, the trade network's that can emerge under (LR). In the initial trade cycle,
each TFTT uses random selection to submit a trade offer to one particular TFTT, and all
such trade offers are accepted. Each Rip likewise uses random selection to submit a trade
offer to one particular TFTT; but whether or not these trade offers are accepted depends on
the behavioral region.
In case (LR.l), a TFTT refuses all trade offers from a Rip prior to any trades taking place.
Under the DCR mechanism, a trader who,has a trade offer refused can immediately submit a
replacement trade offer to a next-most-preferred trader who has not yet refused him. Thus,
by the end of the initial trade cycle, each Rip has made one trade offer to each TFTT which
was refused, and one trade offer to the other Rip which was accepted. Nevertheless, after
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this one trade, the Rips find each other intolerable and never submit trade offers to each
other again. In subsequent trade cycles, each Rip only submits trade offers to the TFTTs.
collecting negative rejection payoffs until, finally, his expected payoff for each TFTT drops
below zero. Thereafter each Rip subsides into wallflowerdom; cf. Figure 3(a).
—INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE—
Case (LR.2) differs from case (LR.l) in only one respect—the Rips never find each other
intolerable. Thus, in the first few trade cycles, each Rip uses sequential random selection
to submit a trade offer to each TFTT in turn, who refuses the offer, and then to the other
Rip, who accepts the offer. Since each refusal results in a negative rejection payoff, R,
the expected payoff that each Rip associates with each TFTT eventually drops below the
expected payoff that each Rip has for the other Rip, which is always nonnegative. In each
subsequent trade cycle the two Rips then submit trade offers only to each other; cf Figure
3(b).
The interesting aspect of both (LR.l) and (LR.2) is that each TFTT is able to use refusal
to protect himself completely from the Rips, so that he never sustains any low L payoffs.
The fitness score of each TFTT at the end of the trade cycle loop is thus C, because C
is the only payoff he ever experiences. In contrast, each Rip sustains negative .rejection
payoffs as well as at least one negative defection payoff before finally settling down either
to wallflowerdom in case (LR.l) or to mutually cooperative trades with the other Rip in
case (LR.2). Consequently, the fitness score of each Rip at the end of any trade cycle loop
is definitely below C and may even be negative. It follows that each TFTT has a higher
fitness score than each Rip at the end of any trade cycle loop, and hence has a reproductive
advantage over each Rip in the subsequent genetic step.
Case (LR.3) is similar to case (LR.2), except that each Rip is able to ob.tain one high H
payoff from each TFTT (inflicting a low negative L payoff on each TFTT in the process)
before collecting rejection payoffs. It is therefore possible for a Rip to end up with a higher
fitness score than a TFTT in the subsequent genetic step. In general, then, as depicted in
Figure 3(c), neither the TFTTs nor the Rips have a definite long-run reproductive advantage
under case (LR.3).®
®For example, suppose (LR.3) holds, and suppose TFTT-2 and TFTT-3 happen to keep submitting trade
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Finally, suppose" case (LR.4) holds. The TFTTs continue to suBmit trade offers .only to
each other in each-successive trade cycle; but, unlike the previous (LR) .cases, they never
refuse trade offers received from a-Rip. .Consequently, a.Ripmever submits a trade offer to
the other Rip; for the trade offers he.submits to the persistently more attractive TFTTs are
never refused. ' '
Indeed, not surprisingly, the behavior of the Rips in case (LR.4) is very, similar to the
eventual behavior of the Rips in case (CP.4) with = (M.+ C)/2: iEach Rip randomly
selects a'TFTT to trade with after every even-numbered trade with a TFTT. More precisely,
in the first trade cycle each Rip randomly submits a trade offer to some TFTT, and he then
submits a trade offer to this same TFTT in the second trade cycle. At the beginning of the
third trade cycle each Rip is again indifferent among all three TFTTs' randomly submits a
trade offer to one of the TFTTs, and latches onto this TFTT for one additional trade cycle.
This pattern repeats throughout the trade cycle loop. The result is that, in every other trade
cycle, each TFTT has, a positiye.probabihty of becoming a host, for each parasitic Rip for
the next two trade cycles, and the Rips never trade with each other at all; cf. Figure 3(d).
It follows; .that each Rip ends up with a higher fitness score than each TFTT, regardless of
the length of the trade cycle loop. . - • •
, Comparing Figure 3 with Figure 2, the TFTTs have an easier time protecting themselves
against the Rips in case (LR),'where they have a more accurate .prior understanding of
the payoffs-they can expect to obtain from each type of trader. While this amount of
information may be excessive, it might well be. reasonable to suppose that, based on past
bad experiences, nice traders have more cautious priors for .untested trade partners than
do street-wise opportunistic traders on the look-out for chumps. Alternatively, nice traders
might develop high minimum tolerance levels, so that refusal occurs-quickly if.trades go sour.
offers only to each other in each successive trade cycle. If both Rips submit trade offers to TFTT-1 in the first
trade cycle, then TFTT-1 obtains the payoffs [C, L, L] in the first trade cycle and a single C payoff in each
subsequent trade cycle. -Assuming [{H+'C)/2] -f // rf' /? < 0, so that a" Rip judges a TFTT to be intolerable
after one refusal,.the worst each Rip.can do is to obtain the payoffs ([/f],[iJ,/f], [il,iJ,/J,Z)]) in
the first four trade cycles and the payoffs [C,C] in each subsequent trade cycle. The faster accumulation of
C payoffs starting in the fifth trade cycle ensures that the'fitness score of each Ripieventually exceeds that
of TFTT-1, given a sufficiently, long trade cycle loop, but each Rip could have a higher fitness score than
TFTT-l'even without this later advantage. If, say, // = 2, C = 1, D = —1, L = —8, and R = —4, then
the fitness score of each Rip exceeds the fitness score of TFTT-1 by the end of the fourth trade cycle and in
every trade cycle thereafter.
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While having a minimum tolerance level set equal to the wallflower payoff, 0, may be locally
rational, in the sense that, average payoffs from trades increase a trader's fitness score if and
only if they are positive, this may not lead to reproductive success in the genetic step if other
opportunistic traders such as the Rips are doing even better; cf. cases (CP.4) and (LR.4).
Ultimately, then, prior expected payoffs and minimum tolerance levels should presumably
both be allowed to evolve conjointly with the traders' strategies. Some preliminary simulation
work on the conjoint evolution of game strategies, prior expected payoffs, and minimum
tolerance levels in the context .of the IPD/CR game can be found in Ashlock et al. [2.
Section 5.4 .
7.3 Comparison with a 5-Player IPD/CR Game
In this subsection the results obtained, above, for the illustrative 5-trader TNG will be
compared with the results obtained in Stanley et al. [19, pp. 153-156] for a 5-player IPD/CR
game consisting of three TFTT and two Rip players. A brief preliminary overview of the
general IPD/CR game will be useful for this purpose.
The general IPD/CR game differs from the general TNG in a number of respects. In
the IPD/CR game, all players can both make and receive PD game offers. All players are
assumed to have the same prior expected payoff, ttq, for the play of a PD game against an
arbitrary opposing player, and to have the same minimum tolerance level, r, which is always
set at the level of the wallflower payoff, W".- Also, all players are assumed to have the same
offer quota, generally taken to be 1; acceptance quotas are not imposed. The choice and
refusal mechanism for partner determination in the IPD/CR game essentially consists of
Step 1 of the DCR mechanism, together with the stipulation that all offers received from
tolerable players must be accepted. Expected payoffs in the IPD/CR game are updated
using a constant-gain criterion filter with a fixed and commonly shared memory weight, u.
Finally, the PD game payoffs and rejection payoff in the IPD/CR game are specified to be
X" = 0, £>" = I, C", and with \ < C* < H*, 'H*/2 < C, and (typically) R* < D".
The illustrative 5-trader TNG under assumption (CP) has been designed to mimic many
of the basic IPD/CR specifications. All traders canmake and receive trade offers, all traders
have the same prior expected payoff, for each other trader, all traders have the same
minimum tolerance level, 0, set equal to the wallflower payoff, = 0, and all traders have
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an offer quota of 1 and a nonbinding acceptance quota. .Moreover, given D" < r .< C".
the following correspondence exists between the 5-trader TNG payoff parameters and the
general IPD/CR payoff.parameters: •• > . •
L = [L'~t]- D = [D'-r]- C = IC'-t]; H = [H" - t] ; (12)
TTo —V
That is, the payoffparameters in the 5-trader TNG can be interpreted as the payoff parame
ters in the general IPD/CR gameafter normalization about the IPD/CR minimum tolerance
level, r. • - ' '• ' i . •
The differences that remain between the illustrative-TNG and the IPD/CR game involve
the use of different choice and refusal mechanisms/for the determination of'partners and the
use of different criterion filter weighting schemes for the determination of updated expected
payoffs. In addition, the different payoff parameterizations for the' two frameworks leads
naturally to differences in emphasis concerning the identification of key parameters governing
the formation of trade networks' (player'interaction patterns). The implications of'these
differences will be discussed after' a'brief summary of. findings 'for the 5'-player IPD/CR
game. • ' • •
The 5-player IPD/CR game'analyzed in Stanley et al. [19," pp. 153-156] focuses attention
on the role of the minimum tolerance level, r. In addition to the paraineter restrictions noted
above for the general IPD/CR game, it'is also assumed that'TTo = C*. Given these restrictions,
it is shown that the IPD/CR parameter space can'bie' partitioned into the following three
regions:' • •
(a) r < C-cj/(l +a;) ;
' ' I ' J ' . r ••
(b) . C"u;/(1 + w) < r, < ujC" + (1 - w) ; , , ,
(c) cjC* + (1 —w) < T .
The use of a constant shared memory weight, a;,,inihe IPD/CR game makes an exact para
metric comparison of these IPD'/CR regions with the TNG behavioral regions inipossible.
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However, the refusal behavior of the TFFTs and the Rips in 2-player raatch-ups is qualita
tively the same in region (a) and the TNG region (GP.4) with = C, in region (b) and
the TNG region (CP.2) with = C, and in region (c) and the TNG region (CP.l) with
Moreover, the long-run player interaction patterns that form in region (a) appear^ to
be quahtatively the same as the long-run trade networks that form in the TNG region
(CP.4) with (7° = C, and similarly for other matched region pairs. The IPD/CR region
(a) where the IPD/CR minimum tolerance level r takes on low values thus corresponds to
the TNG behavioral region (CP.4) where the TNG prior expected payoff takes on high
values: namely, —L < The IPD/CR region (b) where r takes on intermediate values
corresponds to the TNG behavioral region (CP.2) where takes on intermediate values:
namely, —D < < ~L. Finally, the IPD/CR region (c) where r takes on high values
corresponds to the TNG behavioral region (CP.l) where takes on low values: namely,
0 < C/° < -D.
How special is the 5-player IPD/CR restriction that ttq = C", which translates into the
TNG restriction = C? As indicated by Propositions 7.2 and 7.3, this assumption rules
out that part of TNG behavioral region (CP.4) where each TFTT is either definitely or
almost surely, a repeated host: for each parasitic Rip. Essentially, the restriction = C
prevents players from having highly optimistic prior expected payoffs. More generally, the
assumption that the traders share a common prior expected payoff rules out heterogeneous
prior expectations such as those imphed by assumption (LR). .
What effects, if any, do- the different implementations for partner selection in the 5-
trader TNG and the 5-player IPD/CR have on the formation of long-run player interaction
patterns? The DCR mechanism used in the TNG essentially speeds up the process by which
traders settle into trades with preferred trading partners, for it permits a trader to issue a
replacement trade offer to a next-most-preferred trader as soon as he has an offer refused.
In the IPD/CR game, a player who has an offer refused must wait until the next iteration
(trade cycle) before making another offer.
®The qualifier "appear" is used because the findings for the 5-player IPD/CR game in region (a) are
not formally proved. The reliance on a constant memory weight, u, in the IPD/CR game results in rather
complicated expressions for expected payoffs, so that analogs for relationships such as (9) through (11) are
difficult to obtain in useful form.
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When the TNG acceptance quotas are nonbinding; as for' the illustrative"5-trader TNG.
this speeding up of trades may not be very important from a long-run perspective. A-TNG
buyer is then refused by a seller if and only>if the seller finds him intolerable-and henccwill
never accept a trade offer from him. In this case the DCR'mechanism essentially compresses
into one trade cycle what would be multiple iteration outcomes in the IPD/CR. The DCR
mechanism might save some buyers from receiving rejection payoffs by forcing them to issue
their immediate replacement offers only'to sellers who have not yet refused them, but it
does not affect who ultimately plays with whom. Comparing'the-illustrative 5-trader TNG
under assumption (CP) with the illustrative 5-player IPD/CR game, this is seen to be the
case. The long-run trade networks that form' in the TNG regions (CP.l) and (CP.2) stabilize
within the first few trade cycles because refused offers are immediately redirected, whereas
the long-run player interaction patterns that form in the corresponding IPD/CR regions (b)
and (c) take longer to gel. On the other hand, in the TNG region (CP.4) and:_the IPD/CR
region (a) where no refusals occur, the longrrun networks appear to'form in a comparable
number of^cycles (iterations). , • •
When acceptance quotas are binding, however, a buyer in the-TNG may be refused only
because there is currently not enough room on a preferred seller's waiting-list to accommo
date all of the buyers that the seller finds,tolerable. In this case, .upon being refused, it is
not irrational for the bu^er to submit another offer to this preferred seller in the next trade
cycle; for, in the meanwhile, some of the buyers currently .on the .preferred seller's waiting-
list might have fallen out of the seller's favor. Under, the DCR,mechanism, however, the
buyer does not sit idly by, waiting for this future opportunity; he immediately redirects his
refused trade offer to a.,next-most-preferred seller .in the current trade cycle.. Consequently,
by the time the next trade^ cycle rolls around, the buyer might be comfortably settled in
with a different seller. With binding acceptance .quotas, then, the dynamics of the matching
process—who ends up trading with whom—can be essentially affected by the ability to issue
immediate replacement trade .offers, and this may in'turn significantly affect the formation
of long-run trade networks. •• '
Finally, what different effects, if any, result, frorn the use of a different weighting scheme
for the updating of expected.payoffs? ,As .discussed.in.Section,5, the IPD./CRgame relies on
a constant-gain specification for the criterion filter (a fixed memory weight),.which results in
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current payoffs receiving relatively more weight than past payoffs. In contrast, the TNG relies
on a variable-gain specification for the criterion filter, which results in equal weight being
placed on all past and current payoffs. Intuitively, the use of a constant-gain specification
could destabilize the formation of player interaction patterns; for the players remain highly
sensitive to current payoffs and expected payoffs converge to true average payoffs only in
special circumstances (e.g., ultimately constant payoffs). Although destabiHzation does not
appear to be a problem in the 5-player IPD/CR game for the considered range of parameter
values, it will be interesting to test the robustness of this finding.
8 Concluding Remarks
The trade network game has been developed in modular form in order to facilitate ex
perimentation with alternative specifications.
For example, traders are currently assumed to use the DCR" mechanism to select their
most preferred trade partners on the basis of their expected payoffs, conditional on ex-
ogenously specified minimum tolerance levels. This partner selection mechanism can be
modified, e.g., by allowing the minimum tolerance levels to evolve over time. Moregenerally,
it can be replaced with a probabilistic selectionmechanism in which a higher expected payoff
implies a higher probability of selection, or by a random or round-robin partner selection
mechanism that ignores trader preferences.
Also, trades are currently interpreted as two-person prisoner's dilemma games, but other
types of interactions could instead be considered. For example, trades might instead be
modelled as pure coordination games, as' bargaining games, or as games against nature.
Moreover, the'payoff to a trader engaging in a trade with a potential trade partner might
depend on which other traders are also currently engaged in trades with this trade partner.
In this case, the preferences of the traders would have to be generalized to reflect preferences
over interactions with groups of other traders, as in cooperative game theory; cf. Roth and
Sotomayor [16, Chapter 6]. Unlike standard cooperative game theory, however, the total
and individual payoffs associated with trade coalitions might then depend on subsequent
game play between the traders, where both the outcomes of this game play and the trade
coalitions themselves evolve over time. Two recent interesting studies that investigate the
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endogenous formation of coalition structures when agents have group preference orders are
DeVany [6] and Mailath et al. [13],
The updating of expected payoffs is currently implemented using a criterion filter that
expresses current expectedpayoffs as a simple weighted average of.past realized payoffs. This-
criterionfilter could be replacedwith a moresophisticated filter with state-dependent weights
that reflect the way in which^a trade partner's moves appear to depend systematically on the
previous moves one has made against him. Alternatively, expected payoffs could be updated
by means of a reinforcement learning algorithm such as Q-learning (cf. Sandholm and Crites
17]), or by a Bayesian learning algorithm based on the explicit updating of probability
assessments.
Another interesting extension would be to have buyers and sellers associated with publicly
observable bid and ask prices, and to have' the payoffs that the buyers, and sellers receive
in trades depend on these bid and ask prices as well as on their decisions to cooperate or
defect. The simplest possible approach would be to assign the prices to the traders, as part
of their structural identity. For'example', as suggested by the interesting emergent market
study by Vriend [22], prices could be assigned to sellers, and the sellers could be allowed
to choose their production (quota) levels subject'to input costs and to send out quantity
''
signals to potential buyers concerning the availability of their products. Alternatively, along
the Hnes suggested by Kelso and Crawford [11] for a worker-firm assignment model with
firm-determined salaries, the traders could set their prices in each trade cycle and send out
price signals in an attempt to attract or retain desirable trade partners. An interesting
variation would be to have traders in each trade cycle instead submit sealed reservation
prices, as in the well-known sealed-bid second-price (Vickrey) auction discussed by Roth and
\ • <
Sotomayor [16, pages 195-198 .
Finally, the incorporation of evolutionary selection pressures in the trade network game
raises a host of interesting issues that remain to be explored. For example, can preference
order misrepresentation be an evolutionarily stable tactic under a matching mechanism such
as the DCR? Given bid and ask prices, does price collusion emerge? Given the conjoint
evolution of trade strategies and the trade partner selection mechanism, will traders always
evolve to stable matching outcomes? Can evolution be used to "grow" trade institutions
that exhibit socially desirable properties?
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These questions will be the subject of future studies.
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A.l PROOFS FOR SECTION 4 PROPOSITIONS
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Under the DCR mechanism, each of the A7 buyers in B
can be refused at most once by each of the N sellers in 5 in any given trade cycle. Thus in
any given trade cycle, by the end of Step A/A', either each of the M buyers has been refused
once by each of the N sellers, implying no further offers can take place and K' < MN, or a
step has occurred with no refusals taking place, which again implies A'" < MN. •
LEMMA A.l. Under the DCR mechanism, if a buyer m ever makes an offer to a seller
n during some trade cycle T, he must previously have made offers in trade cycle T to all
sellers ranked strictly higher than seller n. Moreover, if a buyer does not make an offer to
some tolerable seller n during some trade cycle T, then it must be that buyer m has had 0^
offers accepted at the end of trade cycle T by sellers that buyer m ranks at least as high as
seller n. Finally, if a buyer m is matched with fewer than Om sellers at the end of an trade
cycle T. he must have made offers in trade cycle T to every seller he finds tolerable.
Proof of Lemma A.l. The proof is immediate from the design of the DCR mechanism
outlined in Section 4. •
LEMMA A.2. Under the DCR mechanism, if a seller n ever refuses an offer from a
buyer m during some bade cycle T, then he must also ultimately refuse all offers from buyers
in trade cycle T that he ranks strictly lower than buyer m. Moreover, he will never receive
another offer from buyer m in trade cycle T.
Proof of Lemma A.2. If buyer m is not tolerable for seller n, then seller n will clearly
refuse any offers received from buyers ranked less than or equal to buyer m in whatever step
they are received.
Suppose, then, that seller n refuses an offer from a tolerable buyer m. Then at the time
of refusal it must be the case that seller n's waiting list contains a full quota of An offers
from buyers ranked at least as high as buyer m, implying that the seller will refuse any offer
from a buyer ranked strictly lower than m that is received at this time. But once an offer is
placed on a waiting list, it can only be removed by an incoming offer from a buyer ranked at
least as high. Thus, the waiting list of seller n henceforth always contains at least An offers
which are strictly preferred to any offer subsequently received from a buyer ranked strictly
lower than buyer rrij implying that all such incoming offers will be refused by seller n as well.
On the other hand, if an offer from a buyer k ranked strictly lower than buyer m has
been received and held prior to the refusal of buyer m, then it is not possible for seller n
subsequently to refuse an offer from buyer m. unless the offer from buyer k has either already
been refused or is refused along with the offer from buyer m.
The final assertion follows directly from' the design of the DCR mechanism. •
Proof of Proposition 4.2'. Suppose there exists "a matching outcome G generated by
the DCR mechanism that is not stablei'It -will be shown'that such a supposition leads to a
contradiction. • ' '
Suppose, first, that "there exist matches (m,n')'and (m',n) under G for which conditions
(a), (b), and (c) in Definition 4;2 "hold. By assumption,-then, buyer m must have made an
offer to seller n' that Wcis never refused, and buyer m' must have made an offer to seller n
that was never refused. It follows (Lemma'A.l) tHat buyer m must also have.made an offer
to seller n that seller n refused; for,-by conditions (a), (b), and (c), buyer m ranks seller
n strictly higher than seller n''and'yet is not matched with seller n. However, if seller n
refused an offer from buyer m,-then (Lemrria A.2) seller n must also ultimately refuse all
offers received from buyers that he ranks strictly lower than m, in particular any offer from
agent m'. However, this contradicts the maintained assumption that m' and n are matched.
Now suppose that conditions (a), (b), and (c) in Definition 4.2 hold for G fo.r some'buyer
m and seller n such that m is matched with fewer than' Om sellers despite the fact that n
is tolerable for m. By Lemma A.l, buyer m must then have made an offer to seller n that
seller n refused. It follows by Lemma A.2 that there can exist, no buyer m' that'seller n ranks
strictly lower than buyer m such'that rn! and n'end up being matched under G. Thus, in
order for condition (c) to hold, seller n must be matched with fewer than buyers under
G even though seller'7i finds buyer m tolerable. But the refusal of buyer m by seller n could
only have occurred if, at the time of the refusal, the waiting list for seller n contained a full
quota of An other buyers that seller n ranks at least as high as buyer m. It is then impossible
that seller n could end up matched with fewer than An buyers under G, a contradiction.
Finally, suppose'that conditions (a),-(b),'and (c) in Definition 4.2 hold for G for some
buyer m and seller n such that seller n is matched with fewer than An buyers despite the
fact that buyer m is'tolerable for seller n. From condition (b), either buyer m is matched
with fewer than Om sellers under G despite the*fact he finds seller n tolerable, or buyer m
made an offer to some seller n' that buyer m ranks strictly lower than seller n. In either
case, it follows from Lemma A.l that buyer m must have made an'offer to seller n that seller
n refused. But buyer m is tolerable for seller-n under the currently maintained supposition.
Hence, at the time of .refusal, seller n must have had a full quota of A^ buyers on his waiting
list that he ranks at least as high' as buyer m. It is then impossible that seller n could end
up matched with fewer than An buyers under G, a contradiction.
In summary, if a, matching outcome G is generated under the DCR mechanism, then G
must be stable. •
LEMMA A.3.' Call a seller n "possible" for a buyer m if there is some stable matching
outcome under which (m-n) is a 'match. Suppose each buyer'(seller) has a strict preference
order over the sellers (buyers) hc'finds tolerable. Suppose, also, that G is a matching out
come determined under the DCR mechanism and that some buyer m has an offer refused by
n
a seller n in the course of this determination. Then seller n is not possible for buyer m.
Proof of Lemma A.3. The proof is by induction. Assume that a matching outcome G
is being generated under the DCR mechanism and that at some point P in the generation
process no buyer has yet been refused by a seller that is possible for him. Suppose that
some seller n now refuses an offer from some buyer m. To conclude the proof, it suffices to
establish that seller n is not possible for buyer m, i.e., that buyer m cannot be matched with
seller n in any stable matching outcome.
If buyer m is not tolerable for seller u, then seller n is clearly not possible for buyer
m. Suppose buyer m is tolerable for seller n. Then it must be the case that seller n has
refused buyer m's oifer because seller n's waiting Hst already contains a full quota of An
offers from other buyers ii,... that seller n ranks strictly higher than buyer ni. Also,
each waiting-list buyer 6, must rank seller n strictly higher than any other seller that does
not currently have on his waiting list, except for sellers that have refused an offer from
buyer 6, and hence (by the induction hypothesis) are not possible for buyer 6^.
Consider a hypothetical matching outcome G' that is stable and that matches buyer m
with seller n. Then, to make way for buyer m on seller n's ultimate waiting list under G'.
at least one of the buyers 6^ will have to be absent from this waiting list even though seller
n ranks buyer 6^ strictly higher than buyer m. It follows that conditions (a) and (c) in
Definition 4.2 hold for 6, and n under G'.
Suppose buyer 6, is matched with another seller k under G' that does not have 6, on his
waiting list at point P in the determination of the DCR matching outcome G. Since this
implies seller k is possible for buyer fc,, it follows by previous remarks that buyer 6, must
rank seller n strictly higher than seller k. Hence, condition (b) in Definition 4.2 holds for 6,
and n as well as conditions (a) and (c). a contradiction of the maintained hypothesis that
G" is a stable matching outcome.
Suppose buyer 6, is matched with a total of r sellers under G\ and suppose each of these
sellers has on their waiting list at point P in the determination of the DCR matching
outcome G. Since 6, is not matched with seller n under G', and bg is on n's waiting list at
point P in the determination of G, it follows that r < li < Om^ where u denotes the number
of sellers that have bg on their waiting list at point P in the determination of G. It follows
that 6, is matched with fewer than sellers under G' even though 6, is not matched with
a seller n that he finds tolerable. Hence, condition (b) in Definition 4.2 holds for bg and n
as well as conditions (a) and (c), a contradiction of the maintained hypothesis that G' is a
stable matching outcome.
Finally, suppose buyer bg is not matched with any seller under G'. Since bg is on seller
ns waiting Hst at point P in the determination of G, it must be that seller n is tolerable for
buyer 6,. Thus, condition (b) in Definition 4.2 holds for bg and n as well as conditions (a)
and (c), a contradiction of the maintained hypothesis that G' is a stable matching outcome.
In summary, buyer m cannot be matched with seller n in any stable matching outcome
(i.e.. n is not possible for m) if seller n refuses an offer from buyer m at any point during
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the generation of the DCR matching outcome G. • . • '
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Proof of Proposition 4.3. The stability of each DCRmatching outcome is established
in Proposition 4.2. It remains to show that every buyer matched under a DCR matching
outcome G is at least as well off under G as he would be under any other^ stable matching
outcome, given' strict preference orders over tolerable agents. Moreover, if G' is any other
matching outcome satisfying these properties, then G'= G.
Assume that a'matching outcome G is being generated under the DCR mechanism and
that at some^ point in the generation process no buyer has yet been refused by a seller that
is possible for him. Suppose that some seller n- now refuses an offer from some buyer m.
It then follows from Lemma-A.3 that seller n is not possible for buyer m. Consequently,
by construction, each buyer m is matched under the DCR matching outcome G with the
tolerable sellers he most prefers,'"up to the maximum allowable number Omi except for
tolerable sellers that' he cannot be matched with under any stable'matching outcome.
Let G denote a ^-optimal matching outcome obtained under the DCR mechanism for
trade cycle T, and suppose G' is also a B-optimal matching outcome for trade cycle T. It
will now be'shown that G' must coincide with G.
If G differs from G', then there must exist at least one match that obtains under one
of these matching outcomes but not the other. Suppose, first, that there exists a match
(m', n') under G' that does not obtain under G. Since n' is matched with'm' under the
stable matching outcome G\ it follows from-the proof of Lemma A.3 that ,n' could not have
refused an offer from m' under the DCR-matching outcome (?, for any such seller is not
possible for m'. Consequently, buyer rn' rnust. not have made an, offer'to n' under G.
Let ,..., sj. denote the sellers that m! is matched with under G. Since n' is tolerable for
m', yet m' made no offer to n' under G, it follows from Lemma A.3 that r = O-m'-, i-e., that
buyer m' has a full complement of Cm' accepted trade offers under' G. Moreover, since the
preference order of buyer m' is strict over tolerable agents, biiyer m' must rank each of the
sellers s'^ strictly higher than h'. Also, it follows from Lemm'a A.3 that the sellers s'^ must
be the sellers that buyer m! most prefers, except for sellers that refused offers from buyer
m! and hence are not possible'for buyer m'"(implying, in particular, that they could not be
matched with m! under G'). On the other han'd, since buyer m' is restricted to at most Om'
trades under the matching outcome G'. and m' is matched with n' under G' but not under
G, it follows that at least one of these most preferred sellers, say s'j^ is'not matched with m'
under G'. Conseqently, buyer ra' is strictly worse off under'G' than under G, contradicting
the assumed B-optimality of G'.
In summary, there can exist no ma;tch (m',n') that obtains under G' but not under G.
Now suppose there exists a match (m, n) under the DCR matching outcome G that does
not obtain under G'. Let (n^S2^. •. ^Sq) denote'the sellers that are matched with m under
G. Again using Lemma'A.3, these must be the most preferred tolerable sellers for m, except
for sellers that are not possible for m.' Moreover, q < 0^ if and only if there are at most q
tolerable possible sellers for m.
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Let denote the sellers that are matched with m under G'y where this list
does not include n by assumption. Then, using previous observations concerning q. either
u< q < Om ox u <q = Om- If K < Om? Seller n could be matched with m under G' without
any sacrifice of any other match and yet is not. Since Um(^) > 7-^, this contradicts the
assumed 5-optimality of G'.
Suppose u = q = Om- Then, since m is matched with n under G but not under G". at
least one of the Om sellers s'^ matched with m under G' must not be matched with rn under
G. Again using Lemma A.3, it cannot be the ca?p that m made an offer to under G and
was refused, for any such seller would not be possible for buyer m. Thus, using Lemma A.l
and the assumption of strict preference orders, buyer m must rank seller s'^ strictly lower
than any of the sellers matched with m under G. More generally, any seller matched with m
under G' that is not matched with m under G must be strictly lower ranked than any seller
matched with m under G; for otherwise m would have made an offer to this seller under
G that could not have been refused. It then follows by construction that buyer m strictly
prefers the set of sellers matched with m under G to the set of sellers matched with m under
G', contradicting the assumed B-optimality of G'.
In summary, the DCR mechanism always yields the unique B-optimal matching outcome.
•
A.2 PROOFS FOR SECTION 7 PROPOSITIONS
Proof of Proposition 7.1: Case (CP.4) with ~L < U° < {H + Cj/a. The proof
will be broken up into three subcases: —L < < C; —L < •= C\ and C < <
(//-hG)/2. Note that, in all three subceises, no trader ever refuses a trade offer from another
trader.
Case (CP.4} With -L < < C:
By the end of the second trade cycle each TFTT has either traded once with each Rip
or he has traded with a TFTT. When a TFTT first trades with a Rip, the negative payoff,
L. that he receives from this trade lowers his expected payoff for this Rip below his positive
prior expected payoff, for a trade with a TFTT or a Rip. Thus, if a TFTT trades with
a (necessarily different) Rip in each of the first two trade cycles, he will surely submit a
trade offer to a TFTT in the third trade cycle. Moreover, after submitting a trade offer to a
TFTT, he will never again submit any trade offers to a Rip; for a TFTT's expected payoff
for a Rip is always strictly lower than the expected payoff he has for another TFTT that he
has traded with at least once. Consequently, by at most the end of the second trade cycle,
each TFTT submits all of his trade offers only to TFFTs.
On the other hand, a Rip submits at most one trade offer to the other Rip, because the
negative mutual defection payoff. D, that he receives from this trade lowers his expected
payoff for this Rip below his positive prior expected payoff for a TFTT. Moreover,
once a Rip does trade with a TFTT. his expected payoff for the TFTT remains above U°.
Consequently, by at most the start of the second trade cycle, each Rip is submitting his
trade offers only to TFTTs!
It then follows from (7) and (8) that,,if a Rip never receives abrade offer from a TFTT,
he latches on to the first TFTT to whom he-submits ,a trade,offer; for the expected payoff
he associates with the latter TFTT always.exceeds the prior expected payoff he,associates
with a TFTT. Similarly, if he receives, a trade offer from a TFTT before' he himself has
submitted a trade offer to any other TFTT, and this is the only trade offer,from a TFTT
he ever receives, then he latches on to this TFTT for all subsequent trade cycles.
"It thus remains to show that each Rip in an indefinitely long trade cycle loop eventually
latches on to a single TFTT, evenaf he encounters.multiple TFTTs. To establish this, it
suffices in turn to .show ^that, given any two currently most-preferred TFTT trade partners,
subsequent Rip'trades necessarily bring Rip..to a point where he ceases making any further
trade offers to one of these TFTTs. [As will be seen, below, it is of no consequence if the
third TF,TT is currently ranked equally with one or both of these two, TFTTs.
Suppose at least two trade.cycles have-jpassed, so that Rips receive no further trade offers
from TFTTs.. Suppose TFTT-1 and TFTT-2 are currently .two of the Rip's -most-preferred
trade partners-, in the sense that the third TFTT is not ranked strictly higher than either
TFTTrl or TFTT-2. If the Rip has traded an equal number of times with TFTT-1 and
TFTT-2, then he is indifferent between them. He then must use,random selection to submit
his next trade offer,to a TFTT, which results (in either one or two subsequent trades) in the
Rip having a different number, of trades with his two most-preferred trade partners. Assume
without loss of generality, then, that the Rip has traded N times with TFTT-1 and K times
with TFTT-2, with N> K. ^
If N and K are: both even,, relation (9) implies that'the Rip strictly prefers TFTT-1 to
TFTT-2. Rip .then submits a tra.de offer to TFTT-1 -and obtains a payoff = H from
this trade. It follows-from (11) that-the Rip^thenisubmits a second trader, offer-to TFTT-1,
for = H is strictly greater than 'U^{T) for any N. Moreover, this second trade brings
him to a point where, once again, he has traded an even number of times with both TFTT-1
and TFTT-2 but has more trades with TFTT-1. By induction, then. Rip henceforth strictly
prefers TFTT-1 to TFTT-2, hence he submits no further trade offers to TFTT-2.
If N is odd and K is even, then (9) implies that A(A^ —"1, A') is nonnegative. Also.
P'^ = H. Consequently, (11) implies .that Rip strictly prefers TFTT-1 to TFTT-2. The
next trade v/ith TFTT-1 then brings Rip to a point where he has traded an even number of
times with both TFTT-1 and TFTT-2 but has more trades with TFTT-1. By the previous
analysis, it follows that Rip always strictly prefers TFTT-1 to TFTT-2, hence Rip submits
no further trade offers to TFTT-2. ;
Suppose N and K are both odd, implying from (10), that the Rip stictly prefers TFTT-1
to TFTT-2. It then follows from (11) that, after one additional trade'with TFTT-1, the Rip
may find TFTT~2 at least as preferable as TFTT-1; for the payoff = C from this trade
maybe less than (T). [Recall that,C/^{T) converges to (//' + C)/2 as the numberof trades
N becomes arbitrarily large.] This occurs, for example, when = 3, A' = 1, ^7° = C/2,
and H = 3C. However, the Rip .now has A^ + 1 trades with TFTT-1, an even number. If
VI
the Rip now submits a trade offer to TFTT-2 prior to any further trade offers to TFTT-1.
his number of trades with TFTT-2 increases to A' -f 1, and even number, with A* + 1 >
A' + 1. It then follows from the previous analysis that the Rip ceases submitting any further
trade offers to TFTT-2 because TFTT-1 is always strictly preferable. If the Rip still finds
TFTT-1 at least as preferable as TFTT-2 and submits his next trade offer to TFTT-1. then
the number of his trades with TFTT-1 increases to N + 2, an odd number strictly greater
than the odd number of his trades. A', with TFTT-2. The Rip then strictly prefers TFTT-1
to TFTT-2, and the analysis repeats. It follows that, starting with A' and K both odd. the
Rip submits at most one further trade offer to TFTT-2.
Finally, suppose N is even and K is odd. Then the Rip could prefer to trade next with
either TFTT-1 or with TFTT-2. If the Rip trades next with TFTT-1. he then has an odd
number of trades with both TFTT-1 and TFTT-2. with more trades with TFTT-l. As
previously shown, this leads, ultimately, to Rip ceasing all trade offers to TFTT-2. If Rip
trades next with TFTT-2, he then has an even number of trades with both TFTT-1 and
TFTT-2i and the number of trades with TFTT-1, N, either exceeds or equals the number
of trades, A' + 1, with TFTT-2. In the first case, N > A' + 1, the Rip is in a previously-
analyzed situation in which it was shown that Rip henceforth ceases submitting trade offers
to TFTT-2. In the second case, N = A' + 1, random selection is used to determine any
next trade between TFTT-1 and TFTT-2. If TFTT-1 is selected, the the Rip ends up with
an odd number of TFTT-1 trades, A^ H- 1, and an even number of TFTT-2 trades. A' -1- 1.
with A^ -f 1 > A' + 1. This reduces to a previously analyzed case in which it was shown that
the Rip ceases submitting trade offers to TFTT-2. If TFTT-2 is selected, then Rip ends up
with an even number of TFTT-1 trades, A^, and an odd number of TFTT-2 trades. A" + 2.
with A' + 2 > N. This also reduces to a previously analyzed case (with the roles of TFTT-1
and TFTT-2 reversed) implying that the Rip henceforth ceases submitting trade offers to
TFTT-1.
Case (CP.4) with -LkV^^C:
As in the previous subcase with (/° < C, all traders submit their trade offers only to
TFTTs by at most the end of the second trade cycle. Moreover, any Rip that never receives
any trade offers from TFTTs latches on to the first TFTT to whom he submits a trade offer;
and any Rip that receives a trade offer from a TFTT prior to submitting a trade offer to a
TFTT, himself, latches on to the TFTT vvho submitted the trade offer to him. It remains to
show that each Rip in an indefinitely long trade cycle loop eventually latches on to a single
TFTT even if he encounters multiple TFFTs during the trade cycle loop. The proof given
for t/° < C must be modified; for, as seen from (10), the change from < C to = C
means that each Rip is now indifferent between any two TFTTs that he has traded with an
odd number of times.
Suppose, as before, that a Rip has traded N times with TFTT-1 and K times with
TFTT-2, with N > A', where TFTT-1 and TFTT-2 are currently two of the Rip's most-
preferred trade partners. If N and K are both even, or if N is odd and K is even, the proof
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that the Rip eventually ceases.submitting trade offers to one of these TFTTs goes through
as before. Moreover, the proof for N even and K odd goes .through as before if it can be
shown that the odd-odd case still results in a Rip ceasing all trade activity with one of these
TFTTs. It thus suffices .to consider the latter case.
Assume, then, that N. and K are both odd, implying that the Rip is current!}' indifferent
between TFTT-1 and TFTT-2. Then either the Rip ceases submitting any further trade
offers.to TFTT-2, or he submits a trade offer to TFTT-2 at some subsequent time; Suppose
the Rip submits a first subsequent trade offer to TFTT-2 after A'^ -1- / trades with TFTT-1,
where TV -|- / is even. Then, after this .trade, the Rip has traded an even number of times
TV -1- i with TFTT-1 and an even number of times K H- 1 with TFTT-2, where A^ -1- / >
K 4-1, implying by the .previous analysis that the Rip ceases submitting any further trade
offers to TFTT-2. Suppose, instead, that,a first subsequent trade offer to TFTT-2 occurs
after N M trades with TFTT-1, where TV" -!-Tl^ is odd. Then, after this trade, the Rip
has traded an odd number of times, TV + TV/,-with TFTT-1 and-an even number of times,
K -i- 1 with.TFTT-2. Since TV > with both TV and. K odd, TV and K must differ By at
least 2, impying that N -{r M > K h. Consequently, by previous analysis, the Rip ceases
submitting any further trade offers toi TFTT-2.
•In summary, given (CP.4) with —L. ^ each parasitic Rip latches onto one and
only one TFTT host. Moreover, comparing this case to the previous (CPi4) case with —L
< < C, the probability is .now-higher that each TFTT will direct a trade offer to each
Rip during the first two trade cycles; for the prior expected payoff a TFTT associates with
a Rip,is high as the expected: payoff he associates with.another TFTT either before or
after trade .with the TFTT. Consequently, the multiple-encounter scenario is more likely to
occur when — C than when; < C. <
Cast (CP.4) with •C <U^< XH-\- C)/2: ^ / ' '•
Since C < each TFTT is forever disappointed by the unexpectedly low payoff, C,
that he receives from trades with other TFTTs and even more disappointed by the negative
payoff, L, that he receives from an initial trade, with a Rip. Cpnsequently, each TFTT
initially cycles trade offers among all four of the other traders, until he has traded once with
each, and thereafter he cycles his trade offers only among the TFTTs. Since the TFTTs can
receive as well as submit trade offers, the initial testing of potential trade partners undertaken
by the TFTTs takes at most four trade cycles to complete, and ,can be completed in as few
cLS two.
Once a Rip has traded with another Rip, his expected payoff for this Rip is always below
C/°. On the other hand, a Rip obtains an unexpectedly high payoff, H, from an initial trade
with a TFTT; and, given < {H-\-C)/2, his expected, payoff for this TFTT remains higher
than after all subsequent trades as" well. Consequently, a Rip submits at rnost one trade
offer to a Rip," and, once a Rip has selected" a TFTT, he never submits a trade offer to a Rip.
' It follows that each Rip "submits his trade offers only to TFTTs by at most the end of the
first trade cycle.
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Given C <U^ < [H+ C)/2, it follows from (7) and (8) that the expected payoff of a Rip
for a TFTT remains strictly bounded between C and regardless of the number of times
they have traded. Also, using (9) and (10), a Rip is indifferent between two TFTTs if and
only if he has traded with them an equal number of times. Moreover, a Rip that has traded
an even but unequal number of times with two TFTTs strictly prefers the one with whom
he has the highest even number of trades, and a Rip that has traded an odd but unequal
number of times with two TFTTs strictly prefers the one with whom he has the lowesl odd
number of trades.
It will now be shown that each Rip eventually latches on to a single TFTT, given a
sufficiently long trade cycle loop.
Assume that at least four trade cycles have passed, so that all traders submit their trade
offers only to TFTTs. Without loss of generality, suppose that one of the Rips, say Rip-1.
has traded N times with^TFTT-l, K times with TFTT-2, and Q times with TFTT-3, and
that Rip-1 does not strictly prefer TFTT-3 to either TFTT-1 or TFTT-2. If TV = A', either
Rip-1 never trades further with TFTT-1 or TFTT-2, in which caseRip-1 must be latched on
to TFTT-3, or Rip-1 eventually uses random selection to submit a trade to either TFTT-1
or TFTT-2, which results in more trades with one than the other. Consequently, without
loss of generality, it can be assumed that N > K. In particular, then, Rip-1 is not indifferent
between TFTT-1 and TFTT-2, and he is indifferent between TFTT-2 and TFTT-2 if and
only if K = Q and between TFTT=1 and TFTT-3 if and only if TV = Q.
Suppose, for themoment, that Rip-1 only trades with TFTT-1 and TFTT-2. Then, using
relations (9) through (11), the following statements can be verified. First, if K is even, then
Rip-1 never trades further with TFTT-2 because TFTT-1 is strictly prefered and remains
strictly preferred. Second, if K is odd and N exceeds K by at least 2, then Rip-1 submits one
more trade offer to TFTT-2, after which he ceases to trade with TFTT-2 because TFTT-1
becomes and remains strictly preferred. Third, ifK is odd and N = then Rip-1 trades
once with TFTT-2, submits his next trade offer randomly to either TFTT-1 or TFTT-2,
and ceases to trade with the TFTT that was not randomly selected because the other TFTT
thereafter remains strictly preferred. Note that, in each case, Rip-1 ceases submitting trade
offers to one of the TFTTs after an even number of trades with this TFTT has taken place.
Consider, now, the general case in which Rip-1 can submit trade offers to all three TFTTs.
If K is even, the previous 2-TFTT analysis imphes that Rip-1 submits all subsequent trade
offers to TFTT-1, whether N is even or odd, because TFTT-1 remains strictly preferable to
TFTT-2 (and hence also to TFTT-3).
If K is odd and N exceeds K by at least two, the previous 2-TFTT analysis can be used
to show that Rip-1 always latches on to a single TFTT, as follows. Ripp-1 strictly prefers
TFTT-2 to TFTT-1, implying that Rip-1 also strictly prefers TFTT-2 to TFTT-3. Rip-1
thus submits his next trade offer to TFTT-2, raising his trade count with TTFT-2 to the
even number A' + 1 < and Rip-1's expected utility for TFTT-2 drops below his expected
utility for TFTT-I after this trade with TFTT-2. If TFTT-1 is strictly preferred to TFTT-3,
then Rip-1 submits all subsequent trade offers to TFTT-1. Otherwise, = Q > A -|-1, and
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both TFTT-1 and TFTT-3 are now strictly preferred-to TFTT-2. -Rip-l then uses random
selection to submit a trade offer to either TFTT-1.or TFTT-3. .Without loss of generahty.
suppose the trade offer,goes to TFTT-1. If-= QJs even, then, after this next trade with
TFTT-1, Rip-1 submits,all subsequent trade offers to. TFTT-1 as well. Suppose N = Q is
odd. Then after this next trade with TFTT-1, Rip-1 submits a trade offer at TFTT-3, so
that now Rip-1 has traded an even and equal number of times, TV-fl = Q-)-1, with TFTT-1
and TFTT-3. Since -|- 1 exceeds A' -|- 1, TFTT-1 and TFTT-3 are still strictly preferred
to TFTT-2.' Rip-1 then again randomly-submits a.trade^offer at either TFTT-1 or TFTT-3.
but this time Rip-1 submits all further trade offers to whichever TFTT is selected.
Finally, supposeK is odd and N = K1. Again using the previous 2-TFTT analysis, it
can be shown that Rip-1 always latches on to a single TFTT as follows. Rip-1 submits his
next trade offer to TFTT-2, who is strictly preferred to TFTT-l '(a.nd hence also to TFTT-
3.). After this trade with TFTT-2, Rip-1 becomes indifferent between TFTT-1 and TFTT-
2. If Rip-1 strictly prefers TFTT-l (hence also TFTT-2) to TFTT-3, then Rip-1 randomly
submits a trade offer at either TFTT-1 or TFTT-2, and then submits all subsequent trade
offers towhichever TFTT is selected. IfRip-1 is indifferent among all three TFTTs, implying
in particular that Q = N = K I, hence Q is even, then Rip-1 randomly submits a trade
offer to one of the three TFTTs arid then submits all subsequent trade offers to whichever
TFTT is selected. ^ ^ .
In summary, given (CP.4) with < (H f 0/2, each parasitic Rip ultimately
latches onto one and only one host TFTT, given a sufficiently long trade cycle loop. More
over, as seen in the course of the proof,' each TFTT has' an a priori positive probability of
being this host. •
Proof of Proposition 7.2: Case (CP.4) with U° = {H Under the hy
potheses of Proposition J.2, no -trader ever refuses a received .trade order. The behavior
of the-TFTTs is quahtatively the same as in.case (CP.4) with C < <• (// + C)/2. In
particular, all TFTTs submit their-trade offers only- to other TFTTs by at most the end of
the fourth trade, cycle. Also, as in this previous case, a Rip. never submits more than one
trade offer at the other Rip; for the low payoff D that a Rip receives'from the first trade
with the other Rip ensures that^his expected payoff for this Rip remains forever below his
expected payoff for each of the TFTTs. Moreover, a Rip'that has traded an odd number of
times,with,two TFTTs s,till prefers the one with whom he has traded the kast odd number
of times. ♦
On the other hand, given U° ={H C)/2, it is evident from relations (9) and (10) that
a Rip that has traded-an sven number of times with two'TFTTs is'now indifferent between
them. In particular, after every even-numbered trade with aTFTT, aRip's updated expected
payoff for this TFTT is again equal to his prior expected payoff for a TFTT whereas after
every odd-numbered trade with aTFTT a^Rip's updated expected payoff for this TFTT is
higher than his prior expected payoff.
The behavior of each Rip can thus be characterized as follows. Untjl the Rips first
encounter each other through a submitted and/or a received trade offer, each Rip submits
a trade offer to a randomly selected trader after every even-numbered trade, trading twice
with the selected (TFTT) trader. If and when the Rips first encounter each other, at least
one trade takes place between them. In the next trade cycle, each Rip submits a trade offer
to a randomly selected TFTT. In each subsequent trade cycle, each Rip then submits a trade
offer to a randomly selected TFTT after every even-numbered trade with a TFTT, trading
twice with each selected TFTT.
In summary, each Rip switches stochastically 'lack and forth among the three TFTTs for
the duration of the trade cycle loop. This proces. is interupted for at most one trade cycle,
when the other Rip is first encountered. •
Proof of Proposition 7.3: Case (C.P) with {H -f Cj/a < V < H. Under the
hypotheses of Proposition 7.3, no trader ever refuses a received trade offer. The behavior
of the TFTTs is qualitatively the same as in case (CP.4) with C < < (H -f C)/2. In
particular, by the end of the fourth trade cycle, at most, all TFTTs submit their trade offers
only to other TFTTs.
Also, once a Rip has traded with another Rip, his expected payoff for this Rip drops
below his current expected payoff for each TFTT, whether he has traded with this TFTT or
not. It follows that a Rip submits at most one trade offer to the other Rip. A Rip obtains
an unexpectedly high payoff, H, from an initial trade with a TFTT. Since {H + C)/'2 < L'^ .
after his first two trades with a TFTT, a Rip submits his next trade offer to any untested
trade partner that remains. However, by at most the end of the sixth trade cycle, each
Rip submits his trade offers only to TFTTS. As is evident from relations (7) and (S), the
expected payoff of a Rip for a TFTT remains strictly bounded between C and //, regardless
of the number of trades they engage in.
It will now be shown that each Rip ultimately reaches a point where he repeatedly cycles
his trade offers among the three TFTTs in randomly determined order.
Suppose that a point has been reached when all TFTTs and Rips are submitting their
trade offers only to other TFTTs. Suppose, also, that one of the Rips, say Rip-I, has traded
N times with TFTT-1, K times with TFTT-2. and Q times with TFTT-3.
Consider, first, the case in which N = K = Q. where N, K, and Q are all even. Relation
(9) then implies that A(AMi') = d,{N.Q) = A(A',(3) = 0, so that Rip-1 is indifferent
among all three TFTTs. Suppose Rip-1 now randomly selects TFTT-1 for a next trade.
His expected payoff for TFTT-1 is strictly higher than his expected payoff for TFTT-2 and
TFTT-3 after this odd-numbered trade: for the payoff H that a Rip receives on each odd-
numbered trade with a TFTT is always strictly greater than the Rip's current expected
payoff for the TFTT. It follows that Rip will submit yet another trade offer to TFTT-1,
bringing the total number of trades with TFTT-1 up to N -1- 2. By relation (9), however,
A(A'" -1- 2,K) and A(N + 2,(3) are both negative, implying that Rip-1 will now (equally)
prefer TFTT-2 and TFTT-3 to TFTT-1.
Suppose Rip-1 next submits a trade offer toTFTT-2. so that his trade count with TFTT-2
XI
increases to K+1. Using (11), Rip-1 still prefers TFTT-2 to TFTT-1 after this odd-numbered
trade, and he also prefers TFTT-2 to TFTT-3. Rip-1 will then submit a second successive
trade offer to TFTT-2, implying that his trade count with TFTT-2 increases to A' -f 2 =
iV+2. At this point, using (9); Rip-1 becomes indifferent between TFTT-1 and TFTT-2 and
he strictly prefers a trade with TFTT-3. Consequently, in analogy to previous arguments,
Rip-1 will be led to make two-successive trade offers to TFTT-3, which increeises his trade
count with TFTT-3 to Q + 2 = A' 4- 2'= N -\-2. Consequently,,Rip-1 is back in a situation
in which he has traded an equal and .even number of times with all three TFTTs, and the
stochastic cycle then repeats.
A similar argument establishes that Rip-1 cycles among all three TFTTs in the case N
= K = Q, with A^, and Q all odd.
To complete the claim that each Rip-continually cycles his trade offers among among all
three TFTTs, it suffices to show that each Rip must eventually find himself in a situation
where he has traded an equal number of times with each of the TFTTs.
Suppose, then, that Rip-1 has traded N times with some TFTT, say TFTT-1, and K
times with a second TFTT, say TFTT-2, where N > K. If N and K are both odd, or.if N
and K are both even, or if N is even and K is odd, relations (9), (9), and (11) immediately
imply that Rip-1 will submit no further trade offers to TFTT-1 until the number of trades
with TFTT-2 increases to N\ for until this point he will strictly prefer TFTT-2 to TFTT-1.
If A" is odd and K is even, then Rip-1 may submit his next trade offer to TFTT-1. However,
after this one additional trade offer to TFTT-1, Rip-1 will submit no further trade offers
to TFTT-1 until the number of his trades with TFTT-2 increases to TV -(- 1. The general
implication for a Rip's behavior with regard to all three TFTTs is that, ultimately, a Rip
always submits his next trade offer to a TFTT with whom he has previously traded the
least. The ensures-that each-Rip cycles stochastically among the three TFTTs throughout

















FIGURE 1: TWO ILLUSTRATIVE IPD-MACHINES. The expression "a:/y»
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FIGURE 2: LONG-RUN TRADE NETWORKS UNDER! ASSUMPTION (CP)
FOR THE 5-TRADER TNG. A relatively l^ger box indicates a definitely higher
fitness score for-a sufficiently long trade cycle loop. In case (d), the Rip-TFTT in





















FIGURE 3: LONG-RUN TRADE NETWORKS UNDER ASSUMPTION (LR)
FOR THE 5-TRADER TNG. A relatively larger box indicates a definitely higher
fitness score for a sufficiently long trade cycle loop.. In case (d), the Rip-TFTT
interacfions are stochastic.
